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COMMENTS
AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY, THE
CONTINUING CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE, AND STREET
GANGS: A NEW TWIST IN AN
OLD WAR ON DRUGS
"[I]f these [street] gangs are allowed to become entrenched na-
tionwide in the drug distribution business [then] we are going to
have a problem nationally on the scale that is going to be reminis-
cent of the Mafia in its heyday."' The warning is ominous; the
threat is real.
The 1980s have witnessed unprecedented growth in gang size,2
scope of activities, and sophistication. 3 Veteran social worker Useni
Eugene Perkins notes,
Today's Black street gangs are more volatile, more destructive and
more criminally-oriented than their predecessors. They are also better
organized to enact these negative traits. Due to the saturation of
drugs in the Black community, Black street gangs have organized a
network of drug trafficking that generates high profits which they are
not willing to relinquish. And because of the hopelessness and despair
that fester in the Black community, they have more than a sufficient
number of consumers to support this lucrative enterprise.
4
Although sociologists and cultural anthropologists offer a vari-
ety of theories to explain this phenomenon, the explosion of the
drug "crack" cocaine 5 is a driving impulse behind the violent expan-
1 Federal Law Enforcement Role in Narcotics Control in Southern California: Hearings Before
the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1988) (testi-
mony of Gary Feess, Assistant U.S. Att'y, C.D. Cal.) [hereinafter Federal Role].
2 There are an estimated 70,000 gang members in Los Angeles alone. See Robbins,
Armed, Sophisticated and Violent, Two Drug Gangs Blanket Nation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1988,
at B14, col. 3.
3 Federal Role, supra note 1, at 40 (statement of James Bramble, Special Agent in
Charge, D.E.A.).
4 U. PERKINS, EXPLOSION OF CHICAGO'S BLACK STREET GANGS: 1900 TO THE PRESENT
38 (1987).
5 For cocaine to be smoked, it must be converted into its free-base form. To do so,
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sion of gangs. 6 At the forefront of this transformation of Black
gangs into "organized" crime units are two Los Angeles-based
gangs, the Bloods and the Crips, who are "[s]preading a sophisti-
cated pattern of violence and drug dealing across the country...
[a]s far east as Baltimore and Washington, [while] staking out claims
along the way in middle-size cities like Omaha." 7
As a result of these gang activities, crack cocaine is now a
scourge of national proportion. Crack's expansive availability, inex-
pensive price-tag and potently addictive qualities have combined to
wreak havoc on our social fabric. Nowhere is the effect of this dam-
aging combination more magnified than in the social structure of
the Black community.8
While the damage is significant, the cause is not lost. Our law
enforcement sector has responded to the burgeoning crack trade
with force and effectiveness. 9 Our legislatures have responded with
tougher laws and stiffer penalties.10 Finally, our prosecutors have
powdered cocaine hydrochloride is "cut" with an alkali such as ammonia or bicarbonate
of soda. The free-base is then heated to evaporate any remaining water; this leaves a
waxy cocaine precipitate that crackles when smoked. The process thus eliminates the
need to use the unstable solvent ether to extract the smokeable cocaine. Accordingly,
"[c]rack is a street name for a [smokable] cocaine free-base prepared by a method which
does not use solvents." "Crack" Cocaine: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investi-
gations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1986) (state-
ment of Dr. Charles R. Schuster, Dir., National Institute on Drug Abuse).
6 "The appearance of crack has given gang culture a terrible, almost irresistable
momentum. Economic pathology, not surprisingly, is a more powerful causal factor
than putative syndromes of 'family breakdown' or 'ghetto culture.' As the street supply
[of crack] has burgeoned, gang rivalries have exploded into violent battles over sales
territory and profit." Davis, War in the Streets, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'y, Nov. 11, 1988, at
30.
7 Robbins, Armed, Sophisticated and Violent, Two Drug Gangs Blanket Nation, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1988, at Al, col. 5. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see infra Part
IV.
8 See generally Lamar, Kids Who Sell Crack, TIME MAG., May 9, 1988, at 20 (detailing
crack's affect on inner-city youth); U. PERKINS, supra note 4, at 58 (crack in unprece-
dented demand from all sectors of the Black community).
9 Examples of success abound. See generally Detroit Jury: Brothers Are Drug Kings, Chi-
cago Trib., Oct. 28, 1988, § 1 at 6, col. 1 (discussing collapse of Chambers' Brothers
empire which supplied one-halt of Detroit's crack houses); Barton, The Kansas City Experi-
ence: "Crack" Organized Crime Cooperative Task Force, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1988, at 28-31
(discussing taskforce's success in identifying, arresting, and indicting Jamaican posses
that dominated Kansas City's crack trade); Gangs: L.A. Lawless, ECONOMIST, July 2, 1988,
at 25-26 (crediting Los Angeles Police Department gang sweeps with impairing gang
drug trafficking).
10 For example, in 1984, Congress amended the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841, Pro-
hibited Acts A, to improve the section's penalty structure. Among other things, the
amendment made sentencing a function of both the type and the quantity of narcotics
involved, and increased fine levels to create greater punitive and deterrent effects. See
H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 255-60, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3437-42. Also, California recently adopted the "Street Terrorism En-
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responded with new and innovative applications of existing statutes,
including the Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE")" and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 12
to the gang-controlled drug networks.
The creation of a national crack market through the en-
trepreneurial devise of the Crips and the Bloods provides prosecu-
tors with a new, albeit controversial, application of the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise statute. Under the traditional approach, a pros-
ecutor would apply the CCE to a specific Crip or Blood "set" 13 for
operating a narcotics network in a specific neighborhood. This
Comment posits that the prosecutor also may attack the Crips and
the Bloods for aiding and abetting the creation of new crack markets
that are governed by other inner-city gangs in various cities across
the United States. Under this theory, 18 U.S.C. section 2(a), Princi-
pals,' 4 is applied to 21 U.S.C. section 848, the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise. Accordingly, a gang leader convicted of aiding and
abetting a crack network that qualifies as a continuing criminal en-
terprise will be punished as a principal of the enterprise itself.
The validity of this legal theory is unresolved. In litigation un-
related to the gang issue, the Seventh Circuit upheld the application
of aider and abettor liability to a continuing criminal enterprise, 15
while the Second Circuit did not.16
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit's position is cor-
rect. To accomplish this task, the Comment is divided into four
forcement and Prevention Act," which is designed to attack street gangs by focusing on
their organizational structure and patterns of criminal activities. The Act mandates in-
creased sentences for participation in gang-related criminal activities and provides for
asset forfeiture. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20 (West 1988).
11 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
12 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). For an example of a RICO application to a gang-con-
trolled narcotics operation, see United States v. Anderson, Indictment No. 89 C.R. 0909
(N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 26, 1989), and its corresponding press coverage. Gibson, Rukns,
Robinson Indicted For Drugs, Murder, Chicago Trib., Oct. 28, 1989, § I at 1, col. 2.
13 The Crips and the Bloods are umbrella organizations composed of numerous
gang "sets" owing allegiance to either the Blood or the Crip Code. There are 75 Blood
sets and 103 Crip sets in Los Angeles. Each set has its own turf and membership; exam-
ples include the 5-Deuce Hoover Crips and the 118th Street East Coast Crips. For sim-
plicity's sake, this comment will refer to the global designations of "Crips" and
"Bloods."
14 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988). The section states "[w]hoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commis-
sion, is punishable as a principal." For a complete analysis of the application of 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) to 21 U.S.C. § 848, see infra Parts II through IV.
15 United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260
(1989).
16 United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043
(1988).
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parts. Part One reviews the elements of 21 U.S.C. section 848, the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, and its application to gang-con-
trolled drug trafficking. Part Two examines the current split within
the circuits on the applicability of 18 U.S.C. section 2(a), Principals,
to the Continuing Criminal Enterprise offense. Part Three critiques
the arguments of the Seventh and Second Circuits, and concludes
that aider and abettor liability is applicable to the CCE. Finally, Part
Four illustrates a practical application of aider and abettor liability
to a continuing criminal enterprise. Specifically, the leaders of any
Los Angeles-based street gang "set" 17 that is involved in the estab-
lishment of a gang-dominated Chicago crack market will be guilty of
aiding and abetting a continuing criminal enterprise. As such, the
leaders should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) and pun-
ished under 21 U.S.C. section 848 to the full extent of the law.
I. THE CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND GANG
CONTROLLED DRUG NETWORKS-A PERFECT FIT
In the late 1960s, America discovered that a burgeoning drug
problem afflicted society. Exponential growth in drug use defied
provincial perceptions of a small, contained drug sub-culture, and
sophisticated markets emerged to satisfy user demand. In response,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,18 the principal purpose of which was to
"[p]rovid[e] more effective means for law enforcement aspects of
drug abuse prevention and control, and . . . an overall balanced
scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs."' 9
17 See supra note 13. Because the names "Crips" and "Bloods" simply signify alle-
giance to a specific gang code, there are neither formal governing bodies nor designated
leaders to coordinate the activities of the various "sets" within the Crip or Blood na-
tions. See Overend, L.A.P.D. Targets Gang Leaders, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1988, Part I, at 11,
col. 3. Instead, the individual sets have specific leaders. Thus, prosecutors should focus
their efforts on the leaders of the individual sets who are responsible for introducing and
supplying crack to a particular city. Alternatively, if two or more sets join together to
coordinate their drug efforts, the prosecutor's target will be the chosen leaders of what
is essentially a newly ordained joint-venture. As Part III will demonstrate, the govern-
ment is not required to identify a single ringleader. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d
971, 1034 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). Indeed, "[a] defendant
need not be the dominant organizer or manager of a criminal enterprise; the statute
requires only that he occupy some managerial position." United States v. Becton, 751
F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985). However, the prosecu-
tors must focus on the gang's "top brass, and not the lieutenants ..... Garrett v.
United States, 471 U.S. 773, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 927 (1985).
18 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
19 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4566, 4567.
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Congress particularly was concerned with the professional
criminals who organized, supplied, and managed the drug distribu-
tion networks.20 Congress recognized that removing the profes-
sional criminal, or, in the drug vernacular, "kingpin," was
insufficient if the enterprise itself remained functional. The creation
of 21 U.S.C. section 848, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise, pro-
vided the means by which the kingpin would be punished severely
and the enterprise would be dismantled through asset forfeiture. 2'
Moreover, Congress believed that section 848's harsh penalty
provisions also would deter the creation of new criminal enter-
prises.22 The legislative history reveals that "section 408 [codified
as 21 U.S.C. section 848] is the only provision of the bill providing
minimum mandatory sentences, and is intended to serve as a strong
deterrent to those who otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit
traffic [of drugs] .. ."23 The CCE thus has two purposes: 1) to
provide debilitating punishment to existing criminal enterprises;
and 2) to deter the creation of new enterprises.
The statute's sentencing provisions reflect these two goals. A
defendant convicted of operating a continuing criminal enterprise
will be sentenced to twenty years, at a minimum, with the possibility
of life-incarceration. 24 In addition, the defendant will forfeit all as-
20 Congress recognized that the professional criminal would be prone to return to
narcotics distribution after release from prison. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
83 (1969). Congress thus sought to develop a provision that would keep the profes-
sional drug trafficker "out-of-circulation." H. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4576.
21 Congress indentified one purpose of the forfeiture provision as preventing
unindicted members of any drug ring from continuing the illegal enterprise after its
organizers, managers, or supervisors had been convicted under § 848. See W. CORCO-
RAN, M. CARLSON & T. TUCKER, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE CONTINUING CRIMI-
NAL ENTERPRISE STATUTE-SECTION 848 OF TITLE 21, UNITED STATES CODE 4
(monograph prepared for Dep't ofJust. Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Section, 1982)
[hereinafter W. CORCORAN], citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969).
22 W. CORCORAN, supra note 21, at 4.
23 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4576. The Second and Seventh Circuits' disagreement on the appli-
cation of aider and abettor liability to the continuing criminal enterprise stems, in part,
from their different interpretations of § 848's legislative history. For a more indepth
analysis of the legislative history, see Parts II and III, infra.
24 The text of the continuing criminal enterprise provides in part:
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may be up
to life imprisonment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Title 18, or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an indi-
vidual.., and to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this chapter; except that
if any person engages in such activity after one or more prior convictions of him
under this section have become final, he shall be sentenced up to a term of impris-
onment which may not be less than 30 years and which may be up to life imprison-
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sets derived from the enterprise according to the forfeiture provi-
sions provided in 21 U.S.C. section 853.25 However, to secure a
conviction for a violation of 21 U.S.C. section 848, the prosecutor
must establish the following five elements: (1) the suspect has com-
mitted a felony violation of the federal narcotics laws; (2) which was
part of a continuing series of violations; (3) in concert with five or
more persons; (4) for whom the defendant was an organizer or su-
pervisor; and (5) from which he derived substantial income or
resources. 26
The first requirement, a felony violation of federal narcotics
laws, is limited statutorily to violations of either (or both) subchap-
ters I or II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act.2 7 Accordingly, only felony violations of 21 U.S.C. sections
801-972, inclusive, will satisfy this provision. Fulfillment of this ele-
ment thus depends upon the alleged criminal acts of the defendant
ment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of twice the amount authorized in
accordance with the provisions of Title 18, or $4,000,000 if the defendant is an
individual.., and to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this chapter.
(c) Continuing criminal enterprise defined
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub-
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a su-
pervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848(a), (c) (1988).
25 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988). Section 853, Criminal Forfeitures, states the following:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the
United States, irrespective of any provision of State law-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal en-
terprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition
to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims
against, and property or contractual rights affording a source of control over, the
continuing criminal enterprise.
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988). The controversy surrounding the forfeiture provision is be-
yond the ambit of this comment. For an explanation of how this forfeiture provision
applies to the continuing criminal enterprise, see Reed, Criminal Fofreiture Under the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 747 (1985).
26 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988).
27 Id. § 848(c)(1).
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and the charges levied by the federal prosecutor.2 8 Prosecutors
should have little difficulty in fulfilling the felony requirement; as
such, it should not be considered a "threshold" issue for determin-
ing the applicability of the CCE to gang-controlled narcotic distribu-
tion networks.
The second requirement, section 848(c)(2), dictates that the fel-
ony violation must be "part of a continuing series of violations." In
United States v. Collier,29 the court interpreted the term "series" to
mean "[t]hree or more related acts." 30 Subsequently, courts have
adopted universally the Collier definition as the standard of review
for this requirement. However, the contextual demands of a contin-
uing criminal enterprise require that these predicate offenses violate
federal drug laws.
The Collier definition thus dictates a minimum threshold for the
successful application of the CCE. 31 Whether the threshold is satis-
fied is litigated frequently; the defendant will assert that the prose-
cutor impermissibly relied upon felony violations which are not
predicate offenses within the meaning of the "series" require-
ment.3 2 Realistically, however, meeting this threshold is not diffi-
cult, given the multitude of illegal acts necessary to initiate, manage,
and perpetuate a sophisticated criminal enterprise. Therefore, con-
spiracy,3 3 possession, distribution, and smuggling are all felony vio-
28 For a more thorough treatment of what constitutes a felony violation, see W. COR-
CORAN, supra note 21, at 6-8.
29 358 F. Supp. 1351 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'dper curiam, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
30 Id. at 1355. The court also held that "[o]n its face the term 'continuing series' is
not so vague that a person is not sufficiently warned of the consequences of his conduct
nor is it so vague that the judge and jury will be unable to apply that term to the defend-
ant's conduct." Id.
31 The minimum threshold is not defined by number of convictions but rather re-
quires at least three related violations of narcotics laws. See infra note 38 and accompa-
nying text.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1573 (9th Cir.
1989) (defendant unsuccessfully challenged prosecutor's reliance on narcotics violations
not expressly listed in indictment); United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 264 (2d Cir.
1988) (challenged prosecutor's use of conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges as
predicate offenses); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 1986)
(fearing that the jury may have relied on RICO convictions, defendant unsuccessfully
challenged failure of court to utilize special verdict interrogatories which made it impos-
sible to determine which three predicate acts the jury relied upon to find a CCE viola-
tion), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987).
33 Virtually all of the circuit courts accept the use of a conspiracy violation as a predi-
cate offense for the CCE. See, e.g., Aiello, 864 F.2d 257 (despite defendant's claim to
contrary, conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846 qualified as second of three predicate
offenses); United States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 384-85 (3d Cir.) (affirmed use of
§ 846 conspiracy as predicate offense since it neither "collapses" § 848's statutory
scheme nor denigrates Congress' scheme), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987); United
354 [Vol. 81
AIDING A DRUG KINGPIN
lations that satisfy the "series" element.34 Additional violations may
include RICO offenses, 35 aiding and abetting a narcotics offense,3 6
and unlawful use of a communications facility to facilitate a drug
transaction. 3
7
Courts have eased this burden even further by distinguishing
violations from convictions.38 In United States v. Markowski, the Sev-
enth Circuit explained,3 9
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Garrett [v. United States], the CCE
statute is not a sentence enhancement provision or an aggravated ver-
sion of an offense. It is a distinct crime that entails the supervision of a
substantial criminal enterprise. What is important is proof that there
States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1986) (government may rely on § 846 viola-
tion to establish § 848 offense), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 253 n.7 (8th Cir. 1984) (jury in-
structed that felonious conduct in furtherance of conspiracy, which included distribu-
tion, smuggling, and possession of marijuana, may be considered part of "series" of
felonies), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985); United States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 526
(9th Cir. 1984) (predicate offenses included possession and possession with intent to
distribute marijuana), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); United States v. Phillips, 664
F.2d 971, 1031-34 (5th Cir. 1981) (convictions for importation, use of communications
facility to facilitate commission of narcotics felony, and possession satisfied "series" re-
quirement), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
35 See, e.g., Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1226; Sterling, 742 F.2d at 526.
36 Aiello, 864 F.2d at 264 (drug felony violation based upon aiding and abetting may
qualify as "series" predicate where the aider and abettor is also the kingpin).
37 The unlawful use of a communications facility is governed by 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
The statute provides:
(b) Communications facility
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any com-
munication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any
act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter or sub-
chapter II of this chapter. Each separate use of a communication facility shall be a
separate offense under this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, the term'communication facility' means any and all public and private instrumentalities used
or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all
kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of
communication.
21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988). For an application of § 843(b) as a predicate offense, see
United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1988) (issuing orders over phone
on distribution of cocaine in another city violates § 843(b) and serves as predicate viola-
tion); United States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 86 (1988)
(use of phone to facilitate distribution is predicate offense). This prohibition should
prove to be a lethal weapon in the battle against gang dealers because of the gangs'
heavy reliance on telephones and beepers to direct sales of drugs.
38 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1409 (11th Cir. 1989)
(Clark, J., concurring) (violations need not result in convictions if government proves
occurrence beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1484 (1990); United States
v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 432 (10th Cir.) (defendant need not have been previously
convicted of offense of selling marijuana in order for it to be a predicate offense for CCE
purposes), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 325 (1988); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747
(2d Cir. 1984) (overt violation of drug law sufficient even though not the basis of sepa-
rate substantive count), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
39 772 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986).
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was indeed a far-flung operation. Whether this has led to other con-
victions is all but irrelevant to the nature of the CCE offense. This
leads us to interpret 'violation' in the natural way as an offense [and]
not as a conviction.
40
Therefore, it is conceivable that an individual lacking a prior crimi-
nal conviction may be prosecuted successfully under section 848.
The essence of the "series" requirement is to demonstrate a
pattern of violations indicative of both a flagrant disregard for the
law and a propensity for continued criminal activity. The require-
ment, therefore, identifies a class of individuals to which the offense
may be applied. According to the Supreme Court in Garrett,41 this
class is "[t]he 'top brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and
foot soldiers." 42 Section 848's three remaining elements then skill-
fully interact to whittle down this larger class to a core of criminal
offenders (collectively representing the "top brass") who are pun-
ished justifiably under the CCE statute.
The three remaining elements thus afford a measure of protec-
tion not only to minor enterprise employees but also to petty crimi-
nal enterprises. 43 Accordingly, these three elements are the nucleus
of the section 848 offense. They are cumulative barriers which pros-
ecutors must overcome before the CCE properly may be applied to
a gang-controlled narcotics network.
The third element of section 848 requires that the defendant
act in concert with five or more other persons. Although this ele-
ment relates intricately to the concept of management,44 analytically
it is treated here, and by the majority of courts, as a distinct element
of the CCE offense.
InJeffers v. United States, 45 the United States Supreme Court de-
fined "concert" to "[h]ave its common meaning of agreement in de-
sign or plan."'46 TheJeffers Court further declared 21 U.S.C. section
846, Attempt and Conspiracy, to be a lesser included offense of the
40 Id. at 361. See also United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1227 (l1th Cir.
1986) (quoting Markowski, 772 F.2d at 361), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987).
41 471 U.S. 773, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 927 (1985).
42 Id. at 781.
43 See United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir.) (inclusion of "sub-
stantial income or resources" requirement represents Congress' effort to provide some
protection to petty criminal enterprise defendants), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
44 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) is the only section that contains more than one of the
necessary elements for demonstrating a CCE offense. Each of the other elements is
introduced in an independent subsection of § 848. See supra note 24.
45 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
46 Id. at 149. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed the legislative history
of § 848, concluding that had Congress intended a different definition, it would have
expressly indicated its desire. Id. For a more thorough review of the legislative history
on this subject, see id. at 148 n.14.
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continuing criminal enterprise.47 As such, the Court reinforced its
interpretation of "concert" as "agreement" because the essence of
any conspiracy is an agreement among participants to a common
criminal end. The agreement may be proved through either direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence.48
Congress' requirement of five or more other persons is an arbi-
trary minimum threshold about which the legislative history is si-
lent. Essentially, the requirement forces prosecutors to distinguish
between the size, scope, and sophistication of various narcotics op-
erations in order to ensure that the CCE net captures only large
kingpins. Nonetheless, courts interpret this requirement liberally to
eliminate the risk that a shrewd kingpin may avoid CCE's reach be-
cause he or she only directly consorted with four others.49
Accordingly, delegation of authority does not insulate the drug
kingpin. For example, if the defendant personally hired only the
foreman, and the foreman, in turn, hired the members of the crew,
it is fair to conclude that the defendant hired or organized the
crew.50 "Mere delegation of authority [by the defendant] does not
detract from [the defendant's] ultimate status as [the] organizer." 5'
Nor does it matter that the defendant did not have personal contact
with the crew, "[s]o long as it was established that he occupied an
organizational status with respect to those persons." 52 Further-
more, the prosecutor is not required to establish either the five indi-
viduals' identities or that the kingpin had personal contact with any
of these individuals.5 3 Finally, courts consistently rule that the five
people need not be involved in the operation at the same time5 4 or
47 Id. at 150.
48 The standard for proof of agreement for a conspiracy is therefore the same stan-
dard for proof for the "in concert" requirement of the CCE offense. W. CORCORAN,
supra note 21, at 13.
49 United States v. Cruz, 785 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1986).
50 United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1034 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136 (1982).
51 Id.; see also United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988) (highest
bosses may rule indirectly, in ways that leave few traces; thus indirect supervision can
satisfy the management requirement).
52 Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1034.
53 See United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
898 (1978) (defendant's lack of personal contact with two individuals is immaterial be-
cause defendant was "calling shots" with respect to the narcotics operation). Accord
United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018
(1985).
54 Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1034 (citing United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1000 n.14
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979)).
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in the same jurisdiction. 55
Applying these principles to a gang-controlled narcotics opera-
tion should yield sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the
continuing criminal enterprise's third requirement. Membership
in the gang should constitute prima fade evidence of agreement or
common design.56 Participation by a gang member in the drug dis-
tribution process in any capacity, whether as a leader or as a minor
employee, also should be sufficient evidence of the individual's
agreement to the larger gang principle of operating the criminal en-
terprise for profit. Finally, the narcotics transactions conducted by
numerous gang members under the gang leader's supervision will
provide the prosecutor with multiple opportunities to identify five
individuals with whom the leader operated in concert. 57
The fourth element, and the conclusion of section 848(c)(2) (A),
requires that the defendant occupy either an organizer position, a
supervisory position, or any other management position with re-
spect to these five other persons. The Second Circuit noted that
"[t]he language of the statute is disjunctive: the government's bur-
den is only to show that [the defendant] organized, supervised or
managed at least five other persons." 58 Additionally, the kingpin is
not required to have the same type of superior-subordinate relation-
ship with each of the five or more persons involved.59
The extent of the accused's managerial or supervisory capacity
is most readily determined by a continuum that has evolved from
numerous court decisions. The well-defined, hierarchical chain-of-
command anchors one end of the continuum. This structure pro-
vides the most persuasive and easily documented evidence of organ-
ization, supervision or management. 60  At this level of
55 United States v. Fry, 423 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd without
op., 559 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
56 Employees of corporations are considered to work together to achieve the corpo-
rate goals; employment presumes agreement with the corporation's philosophy. Mem-
bership in a gang, particularly one primarily oriented to narcotics trafficking, creates an
analogous common design and agreement. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West
1988) (individual who chooses to promote gang activity knowing full well that the gang
is engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity may be imprisoned an additional year
following other felony conviction).
57 See United States v. Cruz, 785 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1986) (even though defend-
ant never met the two streetcorner sellers, they were included in the proof of the "five or
more other persons" element because they clearly operated within the organization
managed and organized by the defendant).
58 United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1980).
59 Id. at 117. Accord United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 587 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1013 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1186 (1982).
60 Mannino, 635 F.2d at 117.
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sophistication, the defendant's place within the hierarchy establishes
the management element. 61 Thus, a drug kingpin is said to manage
or supervise the network's lieutenants, enforcers, and street-level
salesmen. Indeed, the proposition is well-established that for the
purposes of the CCE statute, the subordinate of an intermediary is
managed by someone further up the organization's structure. 62
The inference of management derived solely from structural
design becomes much less legally tenable as one moves along the
continuum of organizational structure toward decentralization.
Therefore, the focus of establishing supervision or management
shifts to identifying the defendant's interactions with five or more
specific individuals. 63 At this end of the continuum, the manage-
ment element is "[e]stablished by demonstrating that the defendant
exerted some type of influence over another individual as exempli-
fied by that individual's compliance with the defendant's directions,
instructions or terms." 64 However, the statute does not require that
the defendant exercise absolute and exclusive "control" over his or
her subordinates. 65 Use of physical force, 66 instructing the partici-
pants on sales terms and credit,67 and setting up meeting places for
drug transactions are all examples of such influence.
68
At the midpoint of this continuum, there exists a third approach
61 See United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 817 (7th Cir. 1988) (although not using
this standard, the court recognized that an individual's place in the hierarchy or struc-
ture of the organization may be used to establish management or supervision of five or
more persons), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1966 (1989); United States v. Oberski, 734 F.2d
1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1984) (well-defined chains of command under control of kingpin
provide courts with clearest examples of organization). For cases demonstrating this
principle, see United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1988) (trial
testimony established defendant co-managed well-organized hierarchical operation),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 213 (1989); United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1340, 1345-46
(2nd Cir. 1974) (defendant was the undisputed kingpin of corporate-like criminal enter-
prise that distributed 200 kilos of cocaine annually), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974).
Although not a street gang, the Chambers Brothers' crack network in Detroit employed
a Fortune 500-like corporate structure. Wilkerson, Detroit Drug Empire Showed All the
Traits of Big Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988, § 1 at 42, col. 1. Two of the Chambers
Brothers were found guilty by ajury of conducting a CCE. Detroit Jury: Brothers are Drug
Kings, Chicago Trib., Oct. 29, 1988, § 1 at 6, col. 6.
62 See Alvarez, 860 F.2d at 817; Mannino, 635 F.2d at 117.
63 United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 74-5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3164
(1989). Accord United States v. Aguilar, 843 F.2d 155, 157-58 (3rd'Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 305 (1989); United States v. Maull, 806 F.2d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987).
64 United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1988).
65 Id. at 336-37.
66 Id. at 336. Accord United States v.Jones, 801 F.2d 304, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1986).
67 Possick, 849 F.2d at 336.
68 United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 587 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1188 (1985).
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for determining organization, management, or supervision; this is
the "central role" standard. The most frequently cited demonstra-
tion of this standard is United States v. Mannino.69 In Mannino, the
defendant's "[s]uccess as a middleman with a vast network of pur-
chasers and sources of immense supply . . . reveal[ed] his essential
function as an organizer, supervisor or manager."' 70 Other indicia
of conduct sufficiently central in role to satisfy the management ele-
ment may include arranging the purchase as well as the delivery of
the narcotics. 7' Determining the defendant's position on the con-
tinuum is not, however, a rigid exercise. Courts often interchange
elements of the "central role" and "control" standards to ascertain
the extent of the defendant's managerial or supervisory role in less
organized or unsophisticated drug networks.
72
Today's increasingly sophisticated gang narcotics operations, in
essence a microcosm of the gang's organizational structure,
73
should place the gangs on the continuum between the end anchored
by the organized, hierarchical standard and the midpoint, where the
"central rolq" standard becomes the arbiter of the management ele-
69 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980).
70 Mannino, 635 F.2d at 117. See also United States v. Oberski, 734 F.2d 1030, 1032
n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (although defendant was not the chief kingpin and.did not exercise
control, his role as main chemist within organization allowed finding that he organized
narcotic manufacturing process for CCE conviction).
71 United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1331-33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994
(1985).
72 In Mannino, the court also demonstrated five separate instances of the kingpin's
control over his subordinates. Id. at 117. Alternatively, courts may fuse the two stan-
dards, thus creating a hybrid which is used for organizations that fall between the mid-
point and the unsophisticated end of the organizational continuum. See, e.g., Possick, 849
F.2d at 336 (management proved through arranging acquisition/delivery of drugs, use
of force, and directing delivery of profits and payments); Dickey, 736 F.2d at 587 (man-
agement proven through arranging meeting places for two large marijuana transactions,
and ordering subordinates where to store, where to sell, and how to sell marijuana);
Jones, 801 F.2d at 308-09 (management element satisfied through the use of force, set-
ting prices for drugs, and dictating to whom sales may be made).
73 Gang organizational patterns vary according to purpose, age, size, ethnic orienta-
tion, etc. The modern law enforcement perception of the gang is hierarchical. J.
HAGEDORN & P. MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A
RUSTBELT CITY 82 (1988) (the authors, however, take exception to this approach and
argue that a gang's organization must be analyzed according to age groups). Under the
traditional hierarchical model, the leader is followed by a select group of officers who
serve as an advisory board. The next level consists of the remaining hardcore members,
or those who are intricately involved in and are fiercely loyal to the gang. They are also
the most violent criminal members of the gang. Vincent, Information Memo 1 (1988)
(available through Chicago Police Dep't Gang Crime Unit). The lower levels, in de-
scending rank, are the marginal members who are peripherally involved in the gang, id.,
and the "want-to-be's" or those youths seeking to join a gang. For an in-depth view of
the social and cultural system of a gang, see R. KEISER, THE VICE LORDS: WARRIORS OF
THE STREETS (1979).
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ment. Naturally, each gang will vary in sophistication and organiza-
tion, thereby requiring each prosecutor to consider carefully where
on the continuum the gang actually belongs. It is crucial, however,
that larger scale gang-controlled narcotics networks exhibit suffi-
ciently similar organizational characteristics to warrant a general
conclusion about their position on the continuum.
The drug market, an illegal free-enterprise system, is guided
nonetheless by the perennial laws of supply and demand; as such, it
naturally embodies the organizational characteristics of today's
mainstream economic markets. Inevitably, a gang's organization
will mimic the larger structure of society.74 Thus, the en-
trepreneurial principles and practices needed to make any business
venture successful appear in the gang narcotics networks as well.
Accordingly, the gang leaders, like other kingpins, are strategists.
For example, they decide where and how to establish the markets,
arrange the supply and delivery of the narcotics, dictate prices, and
provide for defense of their turf. After charting the gang's course,
the leaders insulate themselves by using lieutenants who, in turn,
employ gang members to implement the strategy.
75
The level of narcotics involvement by the individual gang is, however,
directly related to the size of its membership and the degree of organi-
zational sophistication achieved by the gang. The smaller, less organ-
ized gangs are generally only involved in selling drugs at the street
level. As the gang grows and becomes more structured, it develops
more specialized distribution methods and expands its product from
PCP, marijuana, and pills to heroin and cocaine, due to the larger mar-
gin of profit involved. Several highly organized, well structured gangs
presently active in Chicago are deeply entrenched in the operation of
large-scale narcotics trafficking networks. 76
The crack market further demonstrates these principles. 77
Gangs distribute crack through both street dealers and the opera-
74 T. WILLIAMS & W. KORNBLUM, GROWING UP POOR 77 (1985).
75 This pattern of insulation is universal to any sophisticated narcotics operation. See
M. CHAIKEN & B. JOHNSON, CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUG INVOLVED
OFFENDERS 17 (monograph prepared for Issues and Practices in Grim. Just., Nat'l Inst.
ofJustice, 1988); Profits in a Risky Business: A Look at How New York's Street Drug Tade Works,
NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1989, at 37.
76 SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 100TH CONG., 2D SEss., 1987
UPDATE ON DRUGS AND DROP-OuTs REPORT 19 (Comm. Print 1987).
77 TheJamaican posses, although not an inner-city gang, compete with the gangs for
control of the crack market. As such, they utilize the same distribution techniques and
are organized similarly. For a description of these techniques, see Barton, The Kansas
City Experience: "Crack" Organized Crime Cooperative Task Force, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1988, at
29. The posses, however, import and distribute their own cocaine, while the gangs
purchase the powdered cocaine through independent distributors.
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tion of numerous crack houses within their "turf."78 The lieuten-
ants or other upper echelon members oversee the distribution
system. This role includes converting the cocaine into crack, dis-
tributing the crack to the marketing entities, monitoring sales within
a specific house or between a series of houses, and receiving the
proceeds. A crew boss is designated to manage the actual sales
within the crack house or on the street. The crew boss then assigns
to the workers within the crack house specific roles, including look-
outs, guards, money handlers, and drug dispensers. The workers
may be from any strata of the gang's hierarchy and sometimes in-
clude elementary school students hoping eventually to join the
gang.
A sophisticated hierarchical organization helps the prosecutor.
Instead of having to rely exclusively on the "central role" standard
to prove that the defendant occupied a supervisory or managerial
position within the drug network, the prosecutor may satisfy the
managerial requirement by identifying the gang member's position
within his particular gang's organizational scheme. The leading
case utilizing this approach is the Second Circuit's decision in United
States v. Ayala,79 where the kingpin's enterprise mirrored the distri-
bution system normally employed by gangs. Specifically, Ayala's co-
defendant Gonzalez oversaw a hierarchically organized street-level
heroin operation.80 As such, Gonzalez resided at the pyramid's
apex. Co-defendants Ayala and Betacourt, who were the street
managers, occupied the second level. The third level consisted of
six to eight salaried street distributors. Finally, addicts and teenage
street runners comprised the lowest tier.8t The appellate court af-
firmed the district court's finding that both Gonzalez and Ayala
managed five or more persons due to the nature of their duties and
positions within the hierarchical distribution scheme. 82
The fifth and final element of section 848 requires that the king-
pin derive substantial income or resources from his enterprise. This
requirement is directed solely at the magnitude of the operation in
order to distinguish small-time operators from those actually
targeted by the offense. 83 However, courts have refused to establish
78 Federal Role, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988) (statement ofJames Bramble, Special
Agent in Charge, D.E.A.).
79 769 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1985).
80 Id at 102.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 101.
83 United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part and va-
cated in part, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
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a minimum necessary income to facilitate this distinction.s4 Indeed,
the mechanics of demonstrating substantial income or resources are
generally open-ended. The Tenth Circuit explained that "[t]he gov-
ernment need not prove a definite amount of net profit-it is suffi-
cient to show substantial gross receipts, gross income or gross
expenditures for resources."' 5
Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to demon-
strate substantial income or resources. For example, in United States
v. Chagra,8 6 the Second Circuit held that "[tjhe jury is entitled to
draw the eminently reasonable inference that a defendant running
an expensive drug trafficking operation without another, legitimate
and remunerative occupation is obtaining the funds to transact his
business from his drug transactions. '" 8 7 Thus, circumstantial evi-
dence that the defendant spent large sums of money, in cash, for
various personal items including jewelry, automobiles, real estate,
and a swimming pool, on $5,000 of declared taxable income is suffi-
cient to support a conclusion that the defendant acquired substan-
tial income from his drug operation.88
Alternatively, the defendant's position in the drug network's hi-
erarchy may also provide sufficient circumstantial evidence of sub-
stantial income. For example, in Ayala, evidence that the
organization's street-level sellers made a base pay of $26,000 per-
mitted the jury to accept the inference that the kingpin, a full two
levels higher up in the organizational chart, earned substantial in-
come from his network.8 9 Both the amount of money passing
through the organization and the amount of drugs sold are also ex-
amples of permissible circumstantial evidence of substantial income
or resources. 90
84 United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.) (if Congress had intended a
minimum requirement, it easily could have provided one), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125
(1982). Accord United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3164 (1989).
85 United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 924 (10th Cir. 1988), rehk'g granted, 847 F.2d
660 (1988) (quoting United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 588 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985)). AccordJeffers, 532 F.2d at 1116.
86 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1983).
87 Id. at 258.
88 Dickey, 736 F.2d at 588.
89 Ayala, 769 F.2d at 102. Accord United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974).
90 United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 898
(1978). See also United States v. Gonzalez, 866 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir.) (number of drug
sales made is sufficient evidence of substantial income), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2438
(1988); United States v. Grazzio, 710 F.2d 691, 698 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (purchase of 4800




Today's crack cocaine trade is very lucrative: a $10,000 kilo of
powdered cocaine can be converted, through the cooking process,9 1
into three kilos of crack cocaine valued at $100,000.92 In 1985, at
the start of the crack explosion, "[t]he daily "take" from a rock
93
house operation has been placed at a few thousand dollars in some
instances, and up to $25,000 a house on the first and fifteenth of
each month when welfare checks arrive." 94 By 1987, the Jamaican-
organized posses that controlled crack houses throughout Dallas
were making an estimated $400,000 per day.95 The Crips and the
Bloods, who sell on average twenty-five to forty kilos per month per
gang,96 also make astronomical profits.
The conclusion inevitably follows that gangs derive substantial
income from their narcotics operations, whether proved by expendi-
tures on consumer goods, 97 by the amount of crack sold per month,
or by the amount of profit generated by one kilo of cocaine. Alter-
natively, under the Ayala holding, a gang leader receives substantial
income due to the nature of his or her position within the drug traf-
ficking organization. 98 Indeed, "[m]oneys received by the defend-
ant's underlings may be considered constructively received by the
defendant [kingpin] ....
From this analysis of all five elements of the CCE statute, the
inescapable conclusion is that the CCE offense applies to gang-con-
trolled narcotics distribution networks. More importantly, the CCE
is a potent weapon that should be used against the gangs. The pen-
alty provisions strike at the heart of the gang problem: by targeting
and severely punishing the gang leaders, 00 the continuity of the
91 See supra note 5.
92 Profits in a Risky Business: A Look at How New York's Street Drug Trade Works, NEWS-
WEEK, May 29, 1989, at 37.
93 Rock is one of many street names for crack cocaine.
94 Klein & Maxson, "Rock" Sales in Los Angeles, 69 SOCIOLOGY & Soc. REs. 561, 563
(1985).
95 McGuire, Jamaican Posses: A Call for Cooperation Among Law Enforcement Agencies, Po-
LIcE CHIEF, Jan. 1988, at 20.
96 Hackett & Lerner, L.A. Law: Gangs & Crack, NEWSWEEK, April 27, 1987, at 35.
97 Lamar, Kids Who Sell Crack, TIME, May 9, 1988, at 20, 23 (bulk of crack earnings
goes to conspicuous consumption: cars, jewelry, clothing etc.).
98 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
9 United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 75 (2d Cir.) (citing United States v. Ayala,
769 F.2d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3164 (1989).
100 The controversial concept of focusing enforcement on gang leaders is known as
gang bashing." The underlying principle is that only a very small number of gang
members will have the entrepreneurial and leadership skills with which to lead a gang.
See M. CHAIKEN & B. JOHNsON, supra note 75, at 12-13; Vincent, Information Memo 2
(1988) (available through Chicago Police Dep't Gang Crime Unit) (the leader is the key
to the gang's strength and perpetuation). By removing these individuals from the
streets, the power, organization, and appeal of the gangs are impeded. See Stapleton &
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gang is upset. Absent their leaders, gangs will become less aggres-
sive and thus less criminal.' 01 Furthermore, the forfeiture provi-
sion10 2 accompanying section 848 provides the means to cripple
effectively the remainder of the gang's network 03 and to tarnish the
monetary allure of drugs. The CCE provision is thus a stiff penalty
today and a deterrent for tomorrow's gang activities.
While as yet no formal case law governs the application of the
CCE to gang-controlled narcotics operations, some prosecutors
have recognized its potential value in the war on gangs and drugs.
Prosecutors used CCE indictments against the Jamaican posse in
Kansas City. 10 4 The Los Angeles United States Attorney's Office
identified CCE indictments as a means to "[s]ystematically decimate
these [gangs] and their leadership and to take away the proceeds of
their gains."' 0 5 Still, the potent CCE weapon is exceedingly un-
derutilized in the war against gangs and drugs.
Part I thus provides a conceptual model that demonstrates how
a gang's organization, distribution methods, and scope of illegal
narcotics trafficking fulfill the statutory requirements of the continu-
ing criminal enterprise. The practical application of the CCE statute
to a particular gang is a fact-specific exercise; nonetheless, the
model predicts that the statute will apply despite potential variations
between gang organizations. Having established that a gang-con-
trolled narcotics operation is indeed a continuing criminal enter-
prise, it is now possible to address the two remaining issues: first,
Needle, Response Strategies to Youth Gang Activity (Report by Center for the Assessment of
theJuv.Just. System Sept. 1982), reprinted in Gang Violence and Control in the Los Angeles and
San Fransisco Areas with a View to What Might be Done by the Federal Government: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-17 (1983). The Los
Angeles Police Department in 1988 adopted the gang-bashing theory as the focus of its
enforcement techniques. See Overend, L.A.P.D. Targets Gang Leaders as Tactics Shift, L.A.
Times, Sept. 2, 1988, § 1 at 11, col. 3 (late ed.).
101 "Lacking any reliable theories for why gang-related killings ebb and flow, law en-
forcement officials and gang experts have often suggested that a typical gang set will at
least temporarily fragment if its leaders are eliminated by lengthy state prison
sentences." Overend, L.A.P.D. Targets Gang Leaders as Tactics Shift, L.A. Tinies, Sept. 2,
1988, § 1 at 32, col. 1-2. See also U. PERKINS, EXPLOSION OF CHICAGO'S BLACK STREET
GANGS: 1900 TO THE PRESENT 38 (1987) (a noticeable lull in violent gang activity occurs
when key leaders are in jail).
102 See supra note 25.
103 Although initiated under RICO forfeiture provisions and not the CCE, the govern-
ment's seizure of the Chicago El Rukn's gang headquarters is an apt demonstration of
how the forfeiture concept works. See Gibson & Gorman, Rukns, Robinson Indicted for
Drugs, Murder, Chicago Trib., Oct. 28, 1989, § 1 at 2, col. 3.
104 See Barton, The Kansas City Experience: "Crack" Organized Crime Cooperative Task Force,
POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1988, at 28, 30.
105 Federal Role, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) (statement of Gary Feess, Assistant
U.S. Att'y, C.D. Cal.).
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whether it is possible to aid and abet a continuing criminal enter-
prise; and second, whether the activities of the Bloods and Crips in
assisting the creation of gang-dominated crack networks constitute
aiding and abetting a CCE.
II. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
The multi-billion dollar per annum drug industry has a stran-
glehold on America's social fabric, moral strength, and economic
productivity. A bold and powerful response is necessary. As estab-
lished, the driving purpose of the CCE statute is to strike forcefully
at the upper echelons of the drug markets.' 0 6 Broadening the ra-
dius of CCE's hammerlike stroke to include the aiders and abettors
of the upper echelon also would be a powerful response to the drug
epidemic. But is such an approach legally permissible? The ulti-
mate issue is how large CCE's targeted class of offenders should be.
This section explores the Second. and Seventh Circuit decisions on
this relatively new issue.'
0 7
In United States v. Ambrose, the Seventh Circuit addressed the va-
lidity of applying 18 U.S.C. section 2(a), Principals, to 21 U.S.C. sec-
tion 848, Continuing Criminal Enterprise.108 In Ambrose, ten former
Chicago policemen appealed convictions for aiding and abetting a
continuing criminal enterprise. 10 9 The officers, known as the infa-
mous "Marquette 10," provided protection for two large narcotics
dealers in Chicago's Marquette District. In exchange for money and
goods, the officers tipped off the dealers to impending police raids
and even harassed rival drug dealers. 110 The former officers chal-
lenged their convictions, arguing that Congress could not have in-
tended to subject mere aiders and abettors to the harsh penalties
reserved for the kingpin.''
106 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
107 Despite the approaching 20th anniversary of § 848, the issue of aiding and abet-
ting a continuing criminal enterprise has only been considered in five cases. See United
States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260
(1989); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1043 (1988); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1021 (1988); United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1017 (1985); and United States v. Vasta, 649 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
108 740 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985).
109 Id. at 507.
110 Specifically, the officers
[n~ot only failed to arrest the distributors or their employees, they [also] warned the
distributors of impending raids by honest policemen, ignored many complaints
from citizens about the activities of the distributors . . . and even beat up and




AIDING A DRUG KINGPIN
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected this appeal. The court
held that when the aider and abettor is a member of the kingpin's
organization, he or she may not be charged under 18 U.S.C. section
2(a); however, when the aider and abettor is an independent entre-
preneur who voluntarily assists the kingpin, prosecution under sec-
tion 2(a) is permissible.' 12 This crucial distinction resulted from a
pragmatic analysis of the CCE's punishment objectives and terms.
The CCE is intended to reach the kingpin; accordingly, the king-
pin's employees should be prosecuted under other sections of the
federal narcotics laws that carry lesser penalties. This dichotomy re-
flects the kingpin's greater culpability vis-a-vis his or her underlings.
The court thus reasoned that punishing the kingpin's employees for
complicity under 21 U.S.C. section 848 would emasculate the sen-
tencing differential because kingpins and employees would be pun-
ished equally.1 3 As the court explained, "When a statute reveals on
its face, as section 848 does, the legislators' purpose to make one
class of persons punishable more heavily than another, a court will
not defeat that purpose by applying the general aiding and abetting
statute to the second class." 1 4
However, punishment of the police officers, who were the king-
pins' protectors but not their employees, did not raise such a statu-
tory concern."15 Indeed, the court feared that the opposite result
would occur: a failure to punish the officers as aiders and abettors
would weaken the impact of the continuing criminal enterprise stat-
ute. Accordingly, "[t]he effectiveness of the kingpin statute might
... be reduced if a kingpin's police protectors, such as these defend-
ants, whose efforts enabled large drug enterprises to flourish bra-
zenly for years, could never be punished as aiders and abettors." 116
The court's reasoning suggests that the defendants' protection
of the drug enterprises was so essential to the operations' existence
that the defendants were as culpable as the kingpins themselves."1
7
Since "Congress probably would have wanted them to be punish-
112 Id. at 507-08.
113 Id. at 507.
114 Id. at 508. Cf United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 20 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 823 (1983) (court upheld aider and abettor indictment in conjunction with the sub-
stantive gambling violation since defendant's actions placed him above the class of
"mere bettor").
115 Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 508.
116 Id.
117 Although the court never explicitly stated this conclusion, the inference was
clearly intended. For example, in discussing the possibility of punishing the officers
under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the court wrote that
[t]he penalties are not nearly so heavy as those under section 848, so that under the
position urged by the defendants the aider and abettor could not be punished-as
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able. . . as severely as the kingpins themselves,"' 1 8 the court held that
the police officers were properly convicted for aiding and abetting a
continuing criminal enterprise. 119 Moreover, the court refused to
find the defendants guilty of aiding and abetting a 21 U.S.C. section
846 conspiracy, a charge with a lesser although still significant pen-
alty, because punishment under section 846 would not have prop-
erly reflected the defendants' degree of culpability.
120
Having established the applicability of aider and abettor liabil-
ity to the CCE offense, the Seventh Circuit then addressed whether
the judge, in sentencing the aider and abettor, was bound by the
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of section 848.121 Inter-
estingly, the majority, based on Learned Hand's famous definition
of an aider and abettor, 122 concluded that any aider and abettor, no
matter how insignificant the magnitude or effect of his or her assist-
ance, may be punished under section 848. Thus, even a policeman
who took an isolated bribe from a kingpin but did not provide a
more systematic pattern of protection would be, like the "Marquette
Ten," an aider and abettor of the kingpin.' 23 As such, the officer
would be subject to CCE's punishment provisions.
The court recognized that within this hypothetical, the two clas-
sifications of "crooked" officers had significantly different degrees
of culpability. The court, however, failed to develop a threshold
that could distinguish between these two starkly different culpability
levels. Ideally, the court should have defined a standard that would
allow application of 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) to 21 U.S.C. section 848
only when the aider and abettor's assistance proved instrumental in
perpetuating the criminal enterprise. 124 Instead, the court held that
the sentencing judge would not be bound by the minimum sentenc-
severely as the principal even if he was just as culpable. We do not think that Congress
intended this result.
Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 508 (emphasis added).
118 Id. (emphasis in original).
119 Id. at 508.
120 Id. at 509. See supra note 117.
121 Id. at 508.
122 Learned Hand's famous definition of aiders and abettors appeared in United
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). Hand required that the alleged aider and
abettor "[iun some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as
something that he wishes to bring about, [and] that he seek by his action to make it
succeed." 100 F.2d at 402. However, as the Ambrose majority recognized, the definition
is silent as to the magnitude and essentiality of the aider and abettor's role. Ambrose, 740
F.2d at 509.
123 Id.
124 This is the approach Judge Wood suggested in his dissenting opinion in Ambrose.
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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ing provisions of section 848.125 Thus, the judge could sentence the
officer who took the isolated bribe to two or three years in prison
while sentencing the officer who engaged in the more systematic
pattern of protection to a lengthier period of incarceration. Under
this ruling, any aider and abettor of a kingpin would be punished
under section 848 regardless of the amount or effectiveness of the
assistance rendered. This new judicial sentencing discretion thus
removed the risk that the aider and abettor might suffer dispropor-
tionate or cruel and unusual punishment.
Judge Wood dissented with respect to the issue of sentencing
discretion. 126 While the judge did not object to the majority's reli-
ance on Learned Hand's definition of aiders and abettors, he did
criticize the majority for failing to place the definition within the
context of the CCE. The dissent's analysis corrected this error: by
contextually defining an aider and abettor according to the elements
of the CCE offense, Judge Wood fashioned a test that permitted ap-
plication of aider and abettor liability based on the magnitude and
effect of each individual's assistance to the kingpin.
Judge Wood argued that whenever the aider and abettor inten-
tionally associates with the criminal venture, participates in it as
something he or she wishes to bring about, and tries to make the
venture succeed, then 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) rightly makes the aider
and abettor punishable as a principal. 127 However,
[i]f a defendant does not meet each of the criteria for being an aider
and abettor as applied to a continuing criminal enterprise, that is, if he
has not in fact associated himself with the criminal enterprise, partici-
pated in it, wished its success, and worked to make it succeed, then a
judgment of acquittal should be entered.
128
Judge Wood reasoned that any defendant who satisfied this test
125 Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 510. The majority reached this conclusion based on the re-
quirement of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227 (1983), that a criminal sentence must be pro-
portionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted to pass
constitutional muster under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause. Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 510. The court recognized that in certain situations, the
application of aider and abettor will produce disproportionate punishment.
[here will then be cases where a kingpin's own misconduct is not sufficiently egre-
gious to earn him more than the minimum ten-year no-parole prison sentence and
where the aider and abettor's culpability is much less (maybe he was just a minor
supplier of the kingpin)-yet the aider and abettor would have to be given the same
sentence.
Id. To remove the risk of such a disproportionate result, the majority held that the
judge was not bound by the minimum sentence provision. Id.
126 Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 513-16 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127 Id. at 514 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 Id. at 515 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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would be equally as culpable as the enterprise's principal.1 29
Concurring with the majority, Judge Wood concluded that the
conduct of the "Marquette Ten" clearly amounted to aiding and
abetting a CCE.130 However, he disagreed with the majority's idea
that every third party who provided assistance to a drug kingpin
would be an aider and abettor of a CCE. Using a contextual defini-
tion of aiding and abetting, Judge Wood distinguished the major-
ity's hypothetical of an officer taking a single bribe from the conduct
of the "Marquette Ten." Judge Wood concluded that "[s]uch iso-
lated transactions without more would not necessarily meet the aiding
and abetting test as applicable to a continuing criminal enter-
prise."' 31 Thus, the dissent rejected the majority's notion that sen-
tencing discretion would allow aider and abettor liability to be
applied to any and all third parties.' 32  By adhering to the
mandatory minimum sentencing provision, the dissent in effect re-
quired that prosecutors select only those accomplices whose degree
of culpability approached that of the kingpin. Should the prosecu-
tor not be able to do so, the charge could not be brought.
Shortly thereafter, the Southern District of New York addressed
the same issue in United States v. Vasta;133 Vasta represented the first
time that the CCE aider and abettor liability issue was argued before
a court within the Second Circuit. In Vasta, the court resolved sev-
eral pre-trial motions arising out of a twenty-three count indictment
charging, inter alia, co-defendants Vasta and Abbamonte with oper-
ating a continuing criminal enterprise.134 The fourth count of the
129 Judge Wood wrote,
The sentences in our case, though arguably strict, are certainly not so dispropor-
tionate to the crime involved that they amount to cruel and unusual punishment
under the eighth amendment. One who meets the aiding and abetting test as ap-
plied to a continuing criminal enterprise will be much more than a minor offender
and as deserving of punishment as the kingpins.
Id. at 515 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Wood found the
officers' conduct to be so egregious that the conclusion naturally followed that the of-
ficers were equally as culpable as the kingpins they protected. He wrote, "[1]f there be
any merit to the view that aiders and abettors may not be quite as culpable as genuine
principals, this is not the case to try to fashion some exception." Id. at 514 (Wood, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
130 [The former police officers] participated in it, and wanted and tried over a pe-
riod of time to make it succeed.... They had the power to shut the enterprise down
and dethrone the management, but did not do so. These defendants contributed to
the success of the entire criminal enterprise on a continuing basis.
Id. at 514 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131 Id. (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
132 Judge Wood considered Judge Posner's holding to be without support and an invi-
tation to wander outside the legislatively created bounds of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). See id. at
514-15 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133 649 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
134 Vasta, 649 F. Supp. at 978.
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indictment charged two additional defendants, Squitieri and
Paradiso, with aiding and abetting Abbamonte in his continuing
criminal enterprise activities.'
3 5
Specifically, the fourth count alleged that Squitieri and
Paradiso's assistance enabled Abbamonte, while incarcerated, to
maintain communications with his narcotics employees and to ob-
tain heroin supplies, thereby keeping his criminal enterprise
alive.' 3 6 The record further revealed that Squitieri and Paradiso
were independent entrepreneurs, neither employees of the kingpin
nor employees of the kingpin's enterprise.'3 7
Squitieri and Paradiso filed a motion to dismiss the fourth
count, arguing, like the officers did in Ambrose, that Congress could
not have intended to subject aiders and abettors to the same harsh
penalties as a kingpin.' 3 8 However, the court denied the motion.
The court held that because Squitieri and Paradiso were independ-
ent entrepreneurs who expended substantial effort in helping Ab-
bamonte to preserve his heroin network, they could be punished as
principals.' 3 9 The court further noted, however, that accomplices
who provided "low" level or insignificant assistance were exempt
from the harsher CCE punishment. 140
The Vasta court, in contrast to the Seventh Circuit in Ambrose,
recognized, in principle, the need for a "degree of culpability" test
to guide the application of 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) to section 848.
While the court never specifically defined a threshold of culpability
beyond which the aider and abettor would deserve punishment
under section 848, the court's analogy of Squitieri and Paradiso's
actions to the conduct of the corrupt police officers in Ambrose indi-
cates that the threshold would be quite high. The analogy to Am-
brose leads to the conclusion that Squitieri and Paradiso's methods of
assistance, although never specifically identified by the court, were
so significant that without them Abbamonte's heroin operation
would have collapsed.' 4 ' This assistance stands in stark contrast to
that of a "low-level" accomplice.' 42 Thus, the court concluded that
135 Id.
136 Id. at 982.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 982.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
142 The unspoken assumption is that a low-level accomplice will have a lower degree
of culpability. The Vasta court, however, did not provide an example of a lower-level
accomplice. The Seventh Circuit in Ambrose suggested that a minor narcotics supplier of
a kingpin is an example of an aider and abettor with a lower degree of culpability. See
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even though the defendants did not qualify as kingpins under sec-
tion 848, their acts could warrant punishment as principals under
the CCE. 1
4 3
In the subsequent trial, Squitieri and Paradiso were convicted
of aiding and abetting Abbamonte's continuing criminal enterprise.
Paradiso appealed his conviction and twenty-year sentence to the
Second Circuit in United States v. Amen.1 44
Not surprisingly, Paradiso's argument in front of the Second
Circuit differed from his initial argument. Paradiso's new thesis
postulated that "because section 848 applies only to a person in
charge of a CCE, one cannot incur liability for aiding and abetting
such a person."' 45 Persuaded by this reasoning, the Second Circuit
concluded that only those who meet all of the CCE's requirements
may be punished under section 848.146
In rejecting the application of 18 U.S.C. section 2(a), the Amen
court relied almost exclusively on its interpretation of the CCE's
legislative history. The court explained its decision through step-
by-step reasoning that resembles a logician's syllogism: (1) Con-
gress intended to target the ringleaders of large-scale narcotics op-
erations, which the Supreme Court identified as the "top brass" and
not the lieutenants or foot soldiers; 147 (2) when, however, Congress
assigned guilt to only one type of participant in a transaction, it in-
tended to leave the others unpunished for the offense; 148 therefore,
(3) because Congress defined 21 U.S.C. section 848 as targeting the
leadership of the drug enterprises, it necessarily excluded those who
do not lead.149 Paradiso, guilty of assisting in the operation of the
drug ring while Abbamonte served his jail sentence, never served in
a supervisory or managerial capacity in Abbamonte's enterprise.
supra note 125. A police officer who received a single bribe would be another example
of a low-level accomplice whose assistance is too insignificant to warrant the continuing
criminal enterprise's penal sanctions. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
143 The court noted that "[t]he fact that neither defendant himself can be classified as
a drug kingpin to warrant being proceeded against as a principal is irrelevant." Vasta,
649 F. Supp. at 982. The court then cited as support the case of Hagerty v. United
States, 5 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1925) (conviction of a federal officer for aiding and abetting
the impersonation of a federal officer to defraud the government upheld even though
the defendant federal officer could not himself have been convicted of impersonating a
federal officer). Id.
144 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988).
145 Id. at 381.
146 Id. at 382.
147 Id. at 381 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985)).
148 Id. at 381 (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932); United States v.
Farrar, 281 U.S. 624 (1930)).
149 Amen, 831 F.2d at 381.
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Accordingly, Paradiso could not be considered a kingpin; thus, he
could not be punished under the CCE for his complicity.
To support this conclusion, the court traced the evolution of
section 848 from its original proposal as a post-conviction sentence-
enhancement provision to its final passage as a separate federal of-
fense. In principle, the initial proposal resembled a recidivist stat-
ute: following conviction on a narcotics charge, the prosecutor
could petition the court for a finding that the defendant was a spe-
cial offender who, upon release, would revert to his illegal ways. If
the court made such a finding, it could supplement the defendant's
sentence. 150
Congress, however, believed that the 'proposal suffered from
numerous constitutional infirmities.' 5 ' The legislature instead
adopted the Dingell Amendment, which transformed the initial pro-
posal into a separate offense known as the Continuing Criminal En-
terprise. 152 The Second Circuit reasoned that if it could isolate
Congress' motive in passing the Dingell Amendment, it would be
able to determine whether the application of aider and abettor lia-
bility to the CCE was consistent with that intent.
To isolate this intent, the Second Circuit focused on the stat-
ute's targeted class of offenders. If the Dingell Amendment nar-
rowed or maintained the same class of offenders, it inevitably would
follow that the amendment foreclosed the application of aider and
abettor liability, which would have broadened section 848's scope.
If, however, the amendment expanded section 848's targeted class
of offenders, the application of aider and abettor liability to the CCE
would be consistent with congressional intent.
The court recognized that the initial provision, by nature of its
post-conviction format, limited the class to convicted, serious of-
fenders. The Second Circuit concluded that Congress passed the
Dingell Amendment to rectify serious constitutional defects within
the original proposal.' 5 3 Therefore, the amendment was not
150 To review the text of the original continuing criminal enterprise provision, see
infra note 238 and accompanying text.
151 The most significant constitutional objection to the sentence-enhancement provi-
sion was that it "allowed sentencing to be imposed without providing a defendant with
an opportunity to cross-examine persons providing information as to the continuing
criminal offense." Amen, 831 F.2d at 382. For additional objections, see S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 467-74 (1969).
152 See H.R. REP. No. 1444,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. Naws 4566, 4650-52.
153 Amen, 831 F.2d at 382. The amendment sponsored by Representative Dingell was
not, however, free of its own potentially serious constitutional defects or controversies.
See infra note 241.
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designed to broaden the class of targeted offenders. Thus, the Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that the purpose and targeted class of offend-
ers remained constant; the only change was in the means of
procuring stronger punishment. Accordingly, the Second Circuit
concluded,
While the legislative history makes no mention of aiders and abettors,
it makes it clear that the purpose of making CCE a new offense rather
than leaving it as sentence enhancement was not to catch in the CCE
net those who aided and abetted the supervisors' activities, but to cor-
rect its possible constitutional defects by making the elements of the
CCE triable before a jury. 154
Additionally, the Second Circuit, in a quiet rebuke of the Sev-
enth Circuit's reasoning in Ambrose, questioned the ability of courts
to distinguish between the kingpin's employees and those third par-
ties who only "help" the kingpin. 155 The court feared that an em-
ployee of the operation, whose assistance to the kingpin proved
more valuable than that of the "helpful" third party, would be pun-
ished less severely 156 than the aider and abettor. 157 This incon-
gruity, combined with the legislative history, led the court to
conclude that it could not reconcile 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) and 21
U.S.C. section 848 without damaging the "plain terms and clear in-
tent of section 848."158
In 1987, the Second Circuit re-addressed the aider and abettor
liability issue in United States v. Benevento. 159 In this case, Ernest Be-
nevento appealed his conviction for aiding and abetting his nephew
Ernesto's continuing criminal enterprise. The, record revealed the
nature but was unclear as to the extent of Ernest's complicity. Er-
nest, although not employed in his nephew's heroin manufacturing
154 831 F.2d at 382.
155 Id.
156 As established, an employee of a CCE cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting
the CCE. Hence, the employee is provided a degree of protection not available to an
independent aider and abettor who may be subject to CCE's mandatory minimum
penalty.
157 The court indirectly raised a degree of culpability argument through this analysis.
Essentially, it could not justify the mandatory minimum sentence for a third party's
assistance that proved to be of limited effect and magnitude. Judge Wood's dissent in
United States v. Ambrose is a reasoned response to these concerns. See supra note 127 and
accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit later adopted Judge Wood's proposal in
United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
260 (1989). See infra note 170 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the Second Cir-
cuit's concerns are placated because the degree of culpability test ensures that aider and
abettor liability will be applied only in situations where the magnitude and effect of the
assistance is so significant that it enables the enterprise to survive when, in the absence
of the assistance, it would have faltered or even collapsed.
158 Amen, 831 F.2d at 382.
159 836 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988).
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and distribution network, nonetheless provided substantial assist-
ance to that enterprise. 160 Specifically, he allowed his nephew to
use his Arizona home as a heroin laboratory, maintained detailed
financial records for the enterprise, contributed substantial amounts
of capital to help finance his nephew's second narcotics operation,
and attempted to smuggle his nephew's currency out of the
country.1
6'
Despite allegations that Ernest acted in a managerial capacity,
the government lacked sufficient evidence to convict Ernest of vio-
lating the continuing criminal enterprise statute.' 62 Relying on
Amen, which prohibited punishment under section 848 of any de-
fendant who did not independently meet all five CCE statutory re-
quirements, 163 the court reversed Ernest Benevento's conviction on
the CCE charge.' 64
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc in United States
v. Pino-Perez,165 thoroughly re-examined the permissibility of punish-
ing an aider and abettor under section 848.166 Pino-Perez appealed
his conviction and forty-year sentence for aiding and abetting a drug
kingpin. He was "the supplier" of cocaine to a drug ring in southern
Wisconsin supervised by one Nichols.' 67 The record indicated that
Pino-Perez made frequent sales of cocaine in substantial quantities
to Nichols for a lengthy period of time.' 68 In fact, Pino-Perez was a
much larger dealer than Nichols, the kingpin. 169
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Pino-Perez is significant for two
reasons: first, the court reaffirmed the application of 18 U.S.C. sec-
160 Id. at 71.
161 Id. Although the record indicates the types of assistance provided by Benevento, it
is silent as to the effect the assistance had on the operation. It is therefore impossible to
accurately predict Benevento's degree of culpability (i.e., whether his assistance
amounted to a sufficiently significant degree such that it would be proper to punish him
as a principal). The Second Circuit did not need to make this determination since it
rejected the application of aider and abettor liability to the- CCE.
162 Id. at 71-72.
163 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
164 Benevento, 836 F.2d at 71-72.
165 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260 (1989).
166 Judge Posner, writing for the majority, explained,
A court of appeals has a responsibility to reexamine its decisions in light of new
arguments, new evidence, new experience, expecially when by doing so it may be
able to eliminate a conflict between circuits and thereby lighten the Supreme
Court's burden of resolving such conflicts. In that spirit we have undertaken to
reexamine Ambrose, but having done so we adhere to our view that there is 7ider and
abettor liability for assisting a kingpin.
Id. at 1231.
167 Id. at 1232 (emphasis in original).
168 Id.
169 Id at 1232.
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tion 2(a) to the continuing criminal enterprise; and second, the
court finally recognized that the applicability of aider and abettor
liability is a function of the defendant's degree of culpability. In es-
sence, the majority adopted Judge Wood's Ambrose dissent.' 70 Ac-
cordingly, the Pino-Perez court jettisoned the notion that a judge
could disregard CCE's minimum sentencing provision and rely on
his own discretion to sentence the kingpin's aider and abettor.
Nonetheless, the court's first task required resolution of the piv-
otal issue of whether aider and abettor liability could be legally ap-
plied to the CCE. Writing for the majority, Judge Posner could not
say "amen" to the Second Circuit's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. sec-
tion 848's legislative history in Amen.' 7 1 In rejecting the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning, Judge Posner focused on an argument curiously
overlooked in his prior Ambrose opinion. Specifically, he argued for
the majority that 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) automatically applied to 21
U.S.C. section 848 even though Congress did not address the issue
at the time of section 848's passage. 172 However, Posner also noted
that the common law recognized three exceptions to the automatic
application of section 2(a) to the entire criminal code.' 73 He thus
had to demonstrate two independent principles: first, that section
2(a) automatically applied to 21 U.S.C. section 848 (provided, of
course, that section 848's legislative history did not reveal a specific
congressional statement to the contrary); and second, that aiding
and abetting a kingpin did not qualify as a common law exception to
the first principle.
Addressing the first issue, Judge Posner noted that 18 U.S.C.
section 2(a) automatically has applied to every new federal criminal
statute since the precursor to section 2(a) in 1909.174 Accordingly,
"[e]very time Congress has passed a new criminal statute the aider
and abettor provision has automatically kicked in and made the aid-
ers and abettors of violations of the new [criminal] statute punish-
able as principals."' 175
170 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
171 While I would like to take credit for this clever witticism, it really belongs to Judge
Posner. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233. For the Second Circuit's interpretation of 21
U.S.C. § 848's legislative history, see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
172 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233.
173 Id. at 1231-32.
174 Id. at 1233. Judge Posner also cited United States v.Jones, 678 F.2d 102 (9th Cir.
1982), and United States v. Sopczak, 742 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), for the
proposition that "the aiding and abetting provision.., is applicable to the entire crimi-
nal code." Id.
175 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233 (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20
(1980)).
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However, had Congress adopted the initial post-conviction sen-
tence-enhancement provision, liability for aiding and abetting a
kingpin would have been impossible. As Judge Posner explained,
"[T]here would have been no aider and abettor liability for assisting
a kingpin, because there would have been no kingpin offense; there
would just have been kingpin offenders against other criminal stat-
utes.' 176 The Dingell Amendment, however, transformed the post-
conviction proposal into a separate offense. The adoption of the
CCE as a separate offense meant that 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) auto-
matically attached to section 848. Judge Posner recognized that
[i]t was not Congress's purpose in making the operation of a continuing
criminal enterprise a separate offense to bring section 2(a) into play.
But such is never Congress's purpose in creating a new offense. Con-
gress doesn't have to think about aider and abettor liability when it
passes a new criminal statute, because section 2(a) attaches automati-
cally. The question is not whether section 2(a) is applicable-it always
is. 1
77
He concluded, "[T]here is no more reason to infer from [section
848's] legislative history an intent to preclude aider and abettor lia-
bility than there would be to draw such an inference from the legis-
lative history of any other federal criminal statute."'178 Thus, aider
and abettor liability automatically applied to the continuing criminal
enterprise.
With respect to Judge Posner's second issue, the three common
law exceptions to aider and abettor liability are as follows: first,
"when a 'crime is so defined that participation by another is neces-
sary to its commission,' that participant is not an aider and abet-
tor;"'179 second, a victim of a crime such as extortion, blackmail or
bribery may not be charged as an aider or abettor for any of his
conduct that may have assisted in the commission of these
crimes;180 and third, where a criminal statute seeks to protect a
member of a group, that member cannot be found guilty of aiding
and abetting the violation of the very criminal statute that affords
that person protection. 8 1 According to Judge Posner, only the first
exception is pertinent to the CCE offense.' 8 2 More importantly,
Judge Posner argued that "[p]ersons who assist a kingpin but are
176 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233. The Second Circuit agreed with this conclusion. See
supra note 154 and accompanying text.
177 Id. (emphasis in original).
178 Id. at 1234.
179 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1231 (quoting United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 20 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)).
180 Id. at 1232 (citing Southard, 700 F.2d at 19-20).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1232.
3771990]
WILLIAM G. SKALITZKY
not supervised, managed, or organized by him do notfit any of these
three exceptions, and we are reluctant to create a fourth."18 3
However, the first exception does apply to the kingpin's em-
ployees. This distinction, first explored in Ambrose, centers on the
deterrent effect of the CCE. To punish enterprise employees as se-
verely as the kingpin would emasculate the sentencing differential
between the followers and the more culpable leader. However,
punishment of an aider and abettor outside the scope of the king-
pin's authority raises no such threat.18 4 Hence, Judge Posner con-
cluded that the exception may be applied to the kingpin's
employees, but not to the independent third parties who purposely
offer the kingpin assistance.
Having thus established the foundation for 18 U.S.C. section
2(a)'s application to the CCE, Judge Posner proceeded to develop
guidelines for its proper application. He focused on defining when
an accomplice could be considered an aider and abettor. 185
The quintessential distinction between an accomplice who is an
aider and abettor and one who is not is purposeful intent- mere
knowledge of the existence of the continuing criminal enterprise is
insufficient to warrant aider and abettor liability. The court, like
Judge Wood did in his Ambrose dissent, reached this caveat by splic-
ing the essential purpose of a continuing criminal enterprise, its per-
petuation through time, into Learned Hand's famous definition of
aiding and abetting. 18 6 Thus, an accomplice who associated with,
participated in, and, by his actions, sought to make the criminal en-
terprise succeed may be punished as an aider and abettor.18 7
Accordingly, the mere fact, without more, that a marina leased a
boat to a person known to be a drug trafficker would be insufficient
to create liability for the marina for aiding and abetting the king-
pin.' 88 Likewise, supplying any quantity of narcotics to an enter-
prise would not be, by itself, sufficient to create aider and abettor
liability; the supplier also must have wanted the kingpin's enterprise
to succeed. 189 The requirement of purpose thus creates a degree of
culpability threshold that guarantees that aider and abettor liability
will not allow "the more culpable [to be] let off more lightly than the
183 Id. (emphasis added).
184 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
185 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233-36.
186 Id. at 1235.
187 Id. This is the identical test that Judge Wood proposed in his dissent in United
States v. Ambrose. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
188 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1235.
189 Id.
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less culpable." 190
The majority affirmed Pino-Perez's conviction and punishment
for aiding and abetting a continuing criminal enterprise. 191 There-
fore, a supplier who is the major (and possibly only) provider of
drugs to a continuing criminal enterprise in significant quantities
and for a significant period of time purposely promotes the success
of the enterprise. This supplier is a sufficiently culpable aider and
abettor to warrant punishment under section 848.192
In summary, the Second Circuit focused on Congress' intended
class of CCE offenders. The court concluded that Congress only
intended the CCE to apply to the kingpin. Accordingly, when Con-
gress assigned guilt to only one type of participant in a transaction,
it intended to leave the others unpunished. Thus, there is, no per-
missible distinction between the kingpin's employee and an in-
dependent entrepreneur because aider and abettor liability applies
to neither of these individuals. Finally, the court concluded that the
190 Id. at 1236.
191 Threejudges, Easterbrook, Cudahy and Manion, dissented with respect to the aid-
ing and abetting conviction. First, they argued that a supplier of narcotics should be
punished under 21 U.S.C. § 84 1, which doles out greater penalties for the larger quanti-
ties of drugs sold. Accordingly, to punish a supplier under § 848 would "demolish the
graduated structure of penalties under § 841." Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1238 (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Second, the dissent contends that
the majority damaged the language and scope of § 2(a) by declaring that employees of
the enterprise are not subject to aider and abettor liability. Id. at 1238-39 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Finally, if § 2(a) automatically applied to
§ 848, "[t]hen we might dismiss the evolution of § 848 as irrelevant." Id. at 1240 (Eas-
terbrook,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). However, the legislative history
indicated a clear "[d]esire to create mandatory minimum (and life maximum) penalties
for the doyens of drugs, not in achieving increases in the sentences of aides-de-camp." Id.
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis in original). Ac-
cordingly, the majority opinion not only contradicted the expressed purpose of the
CCE, but its creation of immunity for enterprise employees, who naturally assist the
kingpin, damaged the language and structure of § 848. To avoid these adverse conse-
quences, the dissenters reasoned that the prudent choice would be not to apply 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) to 21 U.S.C § 848.
Although the dissent does raise some interesting points, it should be accorded little
significance. Easterbrook essentially challenged the existence of the common law excep-
tion to aider and abettor liability which protects those whose assistance is necessary to
commit a crime that assigns guilt to only one participant. Both the Seventh and Second
Circuits recognize that the exception exists for enterprise employees; these courts differ,
however, as to whether the scope of the exception includes the independent third par-
ties who also provide assistance to the kingpin. This issue is explored in greater detail in
Part III infra.
192 Presumably, the effect of Pino-Perez's steady and bountiful supply of cocaine to
Nichols enabled Nichols to achieve a greater market share than would have otherwise
been possible. Regardless, those who purposely supply an enterprise with the intent to
see the enterprise flourish are guilty of aiding and abetting a continuing criminal
enterprise.
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CCE only applies to defendants who satisfy all five of the statute's
independent requirements.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded that because the fi-
nal version of section 848 created a separate criminal offense, 18
U.S.C. section 2(a) automatically applied to the CCE statute. How-
ever, the court recognized three common law exceptions to the uni-
versal application of aider and abettor liability to the criminal code;
the kingpin's employees fall under one of the exceptions, while in-
dependent entrepreneurs do not. Accordingly, aider and abettor li-
ability applies to those accomplices outside the enterprise who
purposely provide assistance to advance the enterprise's interests.
As such, these offenders may be punished under section 848.
III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
At its most elementary level, the split in the circuits concerns
the scope of the common law exception that "[w]hen Congress as-
signs guilt to only one type of participant in a transaction, it intends
to leave the others unpunished for the offense."' 193 Ultimately, the
debate focuses on whether courts, in applying aider and abettor lia-
bility to the CCE, can distinguish between the kingpin's employees
and the independent third parties who purposely assist the kingpin.
Both circuits recognize the exception but disagree as to its scope.
The Second Circuit interpreted the exception very broadly to in-
clude all CCE participants other than the leader. Conversely, the
Seventh Circuit interpreted the scope of the exception more nar-
rowly so as to include only the employees of the enterprise.
Both circuits cited United States v. Farrar'94 as the basis of the
exception; more importantly, both courts claimed that Farrar sup-
ported their respective, yet inconsistent, interpretations of that ex-
ception. In Farrar, the government sought to prosecute the
defendant for purchasing alcohol for beverage purposes in violation
of section 6 of the National Prohibition Act.195 In essence, section 6
stated that no one shall manufacture, sell, purchase, transport, or
prescribe any liquor without first obtaining a permit. The defendant
therefore argued that section 6 applied only to those persons au-
193 United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021
(1988). See also Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1231 (quoting United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d
1, 20 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)).
194 281 U.S. 624 (1930).
195 Id. at 631. The pertinent part of § 6 of the National Prohibition Act provided that
"[n]o one shall manufacture, sell, purchase, transport or prescribe any liquor without
first obtaining a permit from the commissioner so to do except that a person may, with-
out a permit, purchase and use liquor for medicinal purposes when prescribed by a phy-
sician as herein provided ...." Id.
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thorized to sell, purchase, or deal in liquors for non-beverage rea-
sons.1 96 Accordingly, the defendant maintained that as an ordinary
purchaser, he did not come within the purview of the Act;' 97 there-
fore, he could not be prosecuted for a section 6 violation. In addi-
tion, the court recognized that since long before the adoption of the
Eighteenth Amendment, a purchaser of liquor was not guilty of a
crime even though the sale was prohibited.198 Indeed, "[i]t is fair to
assume that Congress, when it came to pass the Prohibition Act,
knew this history and, acting in light of it, deliberately and design-
edly omitted to impose upon the purchaser of liquor for beverage
purposes any criminal liability."' 99
The occurrence of the criminal offense-the purchase of the al-
cohol for consumption-nonetheless required the defendant's par-
ticipation. The government's decision to prosecute the defendant
represented an attempt to extend aider and abettor liability to a stat-
utorily immunized purchaser. The district court quashed the indict-
ment and the court of appeals affirmed.200 Therefore, Farrar
establishes that when Congress assigns guilt to only one type of par-
ticipant in a transaction, it intends to leave the others unpunished
for the offense.
Despite both circuits' reliance on Farrar, neither circuit ex-
plained why the outcome supported its respective interpretation of
the exception as applied to the CCE. The Second Circuit, in Amen,
merely summarized the Farrar holding as if the holding itself suffi-
ciently demonstrated the truth of the court's reasoning.20 1 The Sev-
enth Circuit's analysis in Pino-Perez, while more in-depth,
nevertheless failed to explain why Farrar permitted a distinction be-
tween a kingpin employee and an independent entrepreneur for
aider and abettor liability.
20 2
196 Id. The regulation was designed to minimize the risk that alcohol provided for
legitimate reasons, such as medicinal needs, would not be illegally converted to the ab-
solutely and unconditionally prohibited use of alcohol as a beverage. Id. at 633.
197 Id. at 632.
198 Id. at 634.
199 Id. Congress apparently wanted to have the purchaser testifying against the seller
rather than punish the purchaser for making the purchase. Id.
200 Id. at 634.
201 United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 823
(1988).
202 The Seventh Circuit did argue, however, that permitting the enterprise employees
to be prosecuted as aiders and abettors of the kingpin would destroy the incremental
deterrence garnered by punishing the kingpin more severely. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at
1232. However, this is not an interpretation of the Farar decision. While the reasoning
is logical, it is insufficient, by itself, to explain why the Farar decision permits a distinc-
tion between CCE employees and independent entrepreneurs who assist the CCE for
the purposes of aider and abettor liability issues.
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Both circuits committed the same analytical error; ironically,
the same type of mistake prompted Judge Wood to dissent in Am-
brose.203 Specifically, both circuits failed to integrate the Farrar ex-
ception into the criminal transactions contemplated by the CCE
offense. Therefore, a careful analysis of Farrar within the context of
the CCE statute is required to determine which circuit's interpreta-
tion is more consistent with Farrar.
Section 848 declares the operation of a continuing criminal en-
terprise to be a criminal offense; however, the enterprise itself can
only be created through a continuing series of narcotics sales be-
tween the enterprise and its client base. Thus, to apply properly the
Farrar exception, it must be analyzed within the context of the drug
transactions contemplated by the CCE provision.
The first step is to identify whom section 848 considers to be
the parties to the transaction. As established, the statute targets the
actual kingpin; the problem is that the kingpin is not normally in-
volved in the actual street-level sales. 204 To circumvent this techni-
cality, the CCE effectively credits the kingpin with the responsibility
for all the sales made by his or her employees. 205 Accordingly, sec-
tion 848 defines the "seller" as the kingpin and his or her employ-
ees; the enterprise and its employees are thus considered a single
entity for transactional purposes. Despite this transactional unity,
however, both circuits recognize that the employees of the kingpin
are immune from aider and abettor liability with respect to section
848. Just as in Farrar, the employees' participation is necessary to
complete the drug transaction; however, the employees are not
targeted by the CCE for prosecution.
Section 848 does not define the "purchaser." Like the thirsty
drinker in Farrar, the drug user must first purchase narcotics to com-
plete the transaction that, combined with other similar transactions,
may culminate in a CCE violation. Just as the prohibition statute
does not punish the purchaser for his role in the alcohol transaction,
the CCE does not punish the drug purchaser.20 6 Under the Farrar
203 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
204 Like any shrewd manager, the kingpin will oversee but not actually participate in
the sale. If the police happen to interrupt the sale and arrest the dealer, the kingpin will
not be present to be arrested.
205 Indeed, the kingpin is credited with all the income received by his street-dealers.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Additionally, the kingpin assumes responsibil-
ity for all of the drugs sold through his organization. See supra note 90 and accompany-
ing text. Finally, the kingpin is credited with supervision over all enterprise employees,
whether or not he has personal contact with them. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
206 Although a current trend in law enforcement is to arrest and punish the purchaser
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standard, the drug purchaser cannot be charged or convicted of aid-
ing and abetting the drug kingpin.
The missing party in the analysis thus far is the independent
third party who voluntarily assists the kingpin. Quite simply, Farrar
does not provide this party with aider and abettor immunity; the
dynamics of a narcotics transaction demonstrate "why." The in-
dependent third party is extraneous: he or she is neither a "seller"
nor a "purchaser." Indeed, the CCE transaction neither depends
upon nor contemplates a third party's existence. The third party's
assistance may be instrumental in enabling the transaction to occur,
but the transaction nonetheless will occur without the assistance.
Indeed, transactions will continue until some factor or factors, such
as an inadequate narcotics supply, police raids, excessive competi-
tion, ineffective communication, or any other market force, cause
the enterprise to close down.
The third party thus assists not by participating in the transac-
tion, but by minimizing "hostile market forces" that seek to prevent
the transaction. A review of the case law demonstrates as much.
Paradiso, in Amen, maintained a communication channel between
Abbamonte and his employees, and secured additional sources of
heroin.20 7 Similarly, in Ambrose, the policemen protected the king-
pin only against the omnipresent forces of law.208 Benevento, in
Benevento, maintained the accounting books and provided a labora-
tory for his nephew20 9 while Pino-Perez, in Pino-Perez, guaranteed an
available supply of cocaine to the kingpin Nichols.2 10 These defend-
ants facilitated but did not participate in the transactions. Their
assistance focused on the continuance of the enterprise as an entity
and not on the actual day-to-day street-level narcotics sales. The
independent third party thus is not part of a CCE transaction, and
therefore must be distinguished from the enterprise employees.
The Farrar exception protects the enterprise employees but not the
independent third parties.
An analysis of the scope of Farrar's "immunity" leads to the
same conclusion. The National Prohibition Act protected the pur-
chaser of alcohol, not the seller, from liability. Therefore, anyone
who aided Farrar in purchasing alcohol could not be punished
under the National Prohibition Act for aiding and abetting a princi-
as well, there are no such provisions incorporated into the CCE provision. As such, a
purchaser of narcotics is innocent of any criminal offense under § 848.
207 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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pal because Farrar never committed a criminal offense.2 1' Accord-
ingly, since the CCE does not punish the drug purchaser/end-user,
a person who aids and abets the purchaser is not punishable under
section 848. However, the narcotics seller is liable under the CCE.
A third party who purposefully assists a narcotics dealer therefore
may be liable as an aider and abettor. Thus, defining the Farrar ex-
ception in terms of the CCE transaction demonstrates the validity of
the Seventh Circuit's position.
In addition to Farrar, the Second Circuit also cited Gebardi v.
United States212 to support its position that only kingpins should be
punished under the CCE. In Gebardi, a man and a woman were in-
dicted for conspiring to transport the woman across state lines to
engage in a sexual relationship in violation of the Mann Act. The
Mann Act sought to punish "[a]ny person who shall knowingly
transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining
transportation for, or in transporting in interstate or foreign com-
merce ... any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or de-
bauchery or for any other immoral purpose .... 21
To violate the Mann Act, two participants, the male transporter
and the female transportee, were needed;214 however, both partici-
pants were not punished equally. The act did not punish the trans-
portee for merely consenting to be transported across state lines for
an immoral purpose. 21
5
For the woman to fall within the ban of the statute she must, at the
least, 'aid or assist' someone else in transporting or in procuring trans-
portation for herself. But such aid and assistance must ... be more
active than mere agreement on her part to the transportation and its
immoral purpose. 2
16
The man and the woman appealed their conspiracy convictions.
211 "It is generally recognized that there can be no conviction for aiding and abetting
someone to do an innocent act." Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262,
265 (1963). Indeed,
[i]n order to sustain the conviction of a defendant who has been charged as an aider
and abettor, it is necessary that there be evidence showing an offense to have been
committed by a principal and that the principal was aided by the accused, although it
is not necessary that the principal be convicted or even that the identity of the prin-
cipal be established.
Hendrix v. United States, 327 F.2d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). Accord
United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976).
212 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
213 18 U.S.C. § 398 (1940) as quoted in Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 118.
214 Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 118-19.
215 "The penalties of the statute are too clearly directed against the acts of the trans-
porter as distinguished from the consent of the subject of the transportation." Id. at
119.
216 Id. at 119.
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The sole issue before the court was the sufficiency of the evidence
for the convictions.21 7 The record revealed that the man purchased
the railway tickets for both parties, and that the woman consented in
advance of the ticket purchases to both the transportation and the
fornication.218 The court ruled that her consent, without more, was
insufficient evidence to convict her of conspiring to violate the
Mann Act.
In applying this criminal statute we cannot infer that the mere acquies-
cence of the woman transported was intended to be condemned by the
general language punishing those who aid and assist the transporter,
any more than it has been inferred that the purchaser of liquor was to
be regarded as an abettor of the illegal sale.2 19
Relying solely on the above quoted language, the Gebardi opin-
ion could be construed to support the exception that when Con-
gress assigns guilt to one party in the transaction, it intends to leave
the others unpunished. In fact, the Second Circuit reached this con-
clusion; however, like its reference to Farrar, the court offered no
illuminating analysis as to why Gebardi explained the outcome of the
CCE aiding and abetting liability issue. The Second Circuit only
commented cryptically that Gebardi held an "acquiescing woman not
guilty of aiding and abetting Mann Act violation. '220
In stark contrast, the Seventh Circuit cited Gebardi to demon-
strate what it deemed to be the-second of the three common law
exceptions to the universal application of 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) to
the criminal code.22' Specifically, the court interpreted Gebardi to
mean that when a criminal statute seeks to protect a "certain group
of persons thought to be in need of special protection," a member
of that group cannot be found guilty of aiding the very criminal stat-
ute that affords the person protection. 222 Ostensibly, the "pro-
tected" group consists of a class often victimized by the
accompanying criminal act; in Gebardi, the female prostitute was the
victim of an immoral transgression. Accordingly, the Gebardi Court
held that the statute manifested a legislative purpose to prevent the
victimized woman's act of consent from being a basis for aider and
abettor or conspirator liability. 223 Under the Seventh Circuit's rea-
217 Id. at 116.
218 Id. at 116.
219 Id. at 119.
220 United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021
(1988).
221 United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
260 (1989).
222 Id.
223 See United States v. Spider, 800 F.2d 1267, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986).
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soning, Gebardi would be irrelevant to the aider and abettor liability
issue because Congress never considered enterprise employees or
independent entrepreneurs who assisted the kingpin to be victims,
much less worthy of Congressional protection.
A careful review of the procedural implications of the Gebardi
decision indicates that the Seventh Circuit is again correct in its
analysis. Specifically, the Gebardi court concluded that mere acquies-
cence without more was insufficient evidence of the woman's aiding
and abetting a Mann Act violation. However, the court also recog-
nized that if the woman had engaged in more active conduct, such as
arranging the trip or purchasing the tickets, 224 her actions would
have transcended mere acquiescence. As such, she would have been
guilty. Thus, it is possible that both parties to the Mann Act transac-
tion may be assigned guilt. Accordingly, the Mann Act, unlike the
National Prohibition Act in Farrar and the CCE provision itself, does
not provide immunity for the second party from aider and abettor
liability when the participant's conduct is more than mere acquies-
cence. With active participation, the female no longer is a victim to
be protected.2
25
The Gebardi decision thus does not demonstrate the exception
to aider and abettor liability proposed by the Second Circuit. As
established, the exception requires a statute to punish only one par-
ticipant in the transaction. The Mann Act, by punishing the first
party and conditioning the second participant's potential liability
upon the nature and scope of that participant's activity, falls outside
the ambit of the exception.
Thus, neither the Farrar nor Gebardi decisions support the Sec-
ond Circuit's arguments against applying aider and abettor liability
to the CCE offense. Instead, when analyzed within the context of
section 848, Farrar persuasively explains why the court may distin-
guish between the enterprise employees and the independent third
224 United States v. Gebardi, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932).
225 The Fourth Circuit recognized as much in Spitler. 800 F.2d at 1267. The Fourth
Circuit initially considered the Gebardi opinion in its more traditional interpretation as
demonstrating the principle that accomplice liability will not be imposed upon those the
statute intends to protect as a victim. Id. at 1276. (In Gebardi, the woman prostitute was
the "victim" of the immoral and criminal transgression.) However, the Fourth Circuit
also recognized that "[w]hen an individual protected by such legislation exhibits con-
duct more active than mere acquiescence.., he or she may depart the realm of a victim
and may unquestionably be subject to conviction for aiding and abetting and conspiracy.
We derive such conclusion.., from Gebardi." Spitler, 800 F.2d at 1276. Thus, in Spiter,
the court found the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting extortion because the de-
fendant's affirmative conduct transposed him from a victim of the extortioner's demands
to an aider and abettor of the extortion. Id. at 1278. Accord United States v. Johnson,
337 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
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parties for the application of aider and abettor liability. Therefore,
the case law decidedly favors the application of 18 U.S.C. section
2(a) to 21 U.S.C. section 848.
Normally, refuting the cited case law would be sufficient; how-
ever, the Second Circuit raised important questions concerning the
legislative history of the CCE provision. If the legislative history
manifests a Congressional intent not to apply aider and abettor lia-
bility to the CCE, then the foundation of the Seventh Circuit's argu-
ment for aider and abettor liability crumbles. Although the Second
Circuit offered the legislative history solely to support its now de-
feated case law conclusions, the legislative history represents a sepa-
rate issue for analysis.
As explained in Part II, the Second Circuit's interpretation of
the legislative history argued that Congress made the continuing
criminal enterprise a separate offense in order to avoid the alleged
constitutional faults of section 848's precursor, the post-conviction
sentence enhancement provision. 226 The court reasoned,
While the legislative history makes no mention of aiders and abettors,
it makes it clear that the purpose of making [the] CCE a new offense
rather than leaving it as a sentence enhancement was not to catch in
the CCE net those who aided and abetted the supervisors' activities,
but to correct its possible constitutional defects by making the ele-
ments of the CCE triable before a jury.227
With such a focused purpose, the Dingell Amendment 228 seemingly
denied the Second Circuit the latitude to apply 18 U.S.C. section
2(a) to 21 U.S.C. section 848. The court concluded, "Normally we
would assume that in enacting a later statute (section 848) Congress
had the earlier one (section 2) in mind and we would reconcile the
two if we could, but we do not believe it possible to do so here and
still remain faithful to the plain terms and clear intent of section
848."229
The legislative history does confirm that Congress adopted the
Dingell Amendment to correct the original provision's constitu-
tional defects. 230 The legislative history does not, however, limit the
226 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
227 United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021
(1988).
228 Representative Dingell (D-Mich.) sponsored the amendment that transformed the
original sentence enhancement provision into a separate offense. See supra note 152.
229 Amen, 831 F.2d at 382.
230 The amendment offered by Mr. Dingell, which was adopted by the full commit-
tee, corrected these defects. Instead of providing a post conviction pre-sentencing
procedure, it made engagement in a continuing criminal enterprise a new and dis-
tinct offense with all its elements triable in court.
Thus, it is seen that the Dingell amendment improved the continuing criminal
19901
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intent of section 848 to such a narrowly defined constitutional mo-
tive. Indeed, to interpret the Dingell Amendment solely as a consti-
tutional remedy misses the subtleties of Congress' action.
Congress implicitly understood that if it chose to make the CCE
a separate criminal offense, it would open the door to aider and
abettor liability.23 ' Congress was not, however, limited to this rem-
edy. A careful reading of the legislative history reveals that Con-
gress had available a second option through which it could have
resolved the original provision's constitutional problems without
having to abandon the post-conviction sentence-enhancement for-
mat. Nonetheless, Congress rejected this approach; instead, it
chose to adopt the Dingell Amendment and to make the continuing
criminal enterprise a separate offense. Had Congress truly desired
to maintain the same size "net" for the CCE, as the Second Circuit
postulated it did, the legislature would have adopted the other op-
tion. However, by adopting the Dingell Amendment, Congress
made it possible for aider and abettor liability to be applied to the
continuing criminal enterprise.
While Congress considered House Bill 18583, the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,232 it also de-
bated Senate Bill 30, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969.233
Both bills contained proposals to enhance the punishment for spe-
cial classes of convicted felons: S. 30 targeted organized crime
figures who were considered dangerous offenders234 while H.R.
18583 targeted drug felons involved in a continuing criminal
activity section. All of the signers of these additional views supported the Dingell
amendment as preferable to the original language.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 84, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 4566, 4651.
231 Since its inception in 1909, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) has automatically applied to every
new criminal code section adopted by Congress. See supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
232 H.R. 18583, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 25374 (1970). For a brief sy-
nopsis of H.R. 18583's progression through Congress to its final form, see 28 CONG.
QUARTERLY WEEKLY REP. 2257-59 (Sept. 18, 1970).
233 S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 827, 831-32 (1969).
234 The primary purpose of Title X, therefore, is to see to it that convicted felons
prone to engage in further crime are imprisoned long enough to give society rea-
sonable protection. While the central thrust of the title is against organized crime,
its impact can be expected to be significant across the criminal justice system as it
faces the dangerous offender.
S. REP. No. 617, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 83 (1969). When S. 30 initially was introduced in
January, 1969, the special offender sentencing provision was listed as Title VII. S. 30,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 801 (1969), reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized Crime Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 21-26 (1969) (statement of Peter W. Low, Assoc. Professor of Law,
Univ. of Va. School of Law) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. Through a series of amend-
ments adding other sections to S. 30, the special offender sentencing provision became
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enterprise. 23 5
The original texts of both bills were almost interchangeable.
The proposed Title X of S. 30, Dangerous Special Offender Sen-
tencing, stated:
(a) Whenever an attorney charged with the prosecution of a defendant
in a court of the United States for an alleged felony committed when
the defendant was over twenty-one years of age has reason to believe
that the defendant is a dangerous special offender such attorney...
may sign and file with the court . .. a notice (1) specifying that the
defendant is a dangerous special offender who upon conviction is sub-
ject to the imposition of a sentence under subsection (b) of this section
236
Furthermore, "(e) A defendant is a special offender for purposes of
this subsection if. . . (3) an offender whose felony offense was in
furtherance of a conspiracy with three or more persons to engage in
a pattern of criminal conduct in which he would occupy a manage-
rial level position or employ bribery or force." 23 7 The original ver-
sion of H.R. 18583 endorsed the same principal, albeit in slightly
different terminology. 238 These parallels are significant.
The proposed procedural processes of these bills were equally
similar. "In both bills, S. 30 and H.R. 18583 in its original form, the
prosecuting attorney is called upon, in order to institute the special
sentencing procedures, to file with the court an instrument specify-
ing that the defendant falls in the category of a special offender, in
Title X. See Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 68-79 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings].
235 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4566, 4649.
236 S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 234, at 68-
69.
237 Id., reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 234, at 71.
238 H.R. 18583 included § 508, Continuing Criminal Enterprises, which provided:
(a) Whenever an attorney charged with the prosectuion of a defendant over the age
of twenty-one years in a court of the United States for an alleged violation of this
title, the authorized penalty for which is imprisonment for more than one year, has
reason to believe that the defendant has been involved in a continuing criminal
enterprise, such attorney... may sign and file with the court.., a notice (1) specify-
ing that such defendant is a person who has been involved in a continuing criminal
enterprise and upon such conviction of such violation will be subject to the imposi-
tion of a sentence under this section ....
... (b)(2) A defendant may be found to be involved in a continuing criminal enter-
prise for purposes of this section if ... the defendant-
(A) played a substantial role in a continuing criminal enterprise involving any
violation of this title in concert with at least five other persons and occupied a posi-
tion of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management...
H.R. 18583, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 508 (1970).
WILLIAM G. SKALITZKY
which case special procedures are provided for sentencing." 23 9
Furthermore,
[b]oth bills provide[d] for a hearing before sentencing wherein the de-
fendant is permitted the ordinary representation and process, except
that he is to be afforded only 'the substance of such parts of the
presentence report as the court intends to rely upon' and this only if
there are not 'placed in the record compelling reasons for withholding
particular information.'
240
Thus, both original proposals were subject to the same criti-
cisms and constitutional challenges. Although not expressly stating
this principle, the House Report's textual treatment of the constitu-
tional objections to H.R. 18583 acknowledged the close relationship
between the two bills. Specifically, the report listed four defects in
the original H.R. 18583 proposal. 241 It then stated,
Even the proponents of this special sentencing procedure had consti-
tutional doubts about it. TheJustice Department conceded: 'The lack
of direct precedent may make it virtually impossible to predict whether
these procedures would survive constitutional challenges.' Senate
Hearings of S.30, page 377. The report on the proposed Organized
Crime Control Act of 1969 (S.30) by the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York says: 'We think that it is unlikely that the proposed
procedures would pass constitutional muster.' The amendment of-
fered by Mr. Dingell ... corrected these defects.
24 2
The report summarized the constitutional challenges to H.R. 18583
by direct reference to S. 30. These bills, based on the same princi-
ple but with slight deviations in linguistic construction, thus faced
identical constitutional challenges.
Nonetheless, Congress solved the identical constitutional chal-
lenges through two distinctly different means. To properly address
the issue whether the Dingell Amendment permits the application of
aider and abettor liability to the CCE, one must first understand the
option that Congress rejected when it made the CCE a separate
criminal offense. The Second Circuit did not use this approach. In-
stead, the court relied exclusively on the House Report on H.R.
239 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4649.
240 Id.
241 The defects are as follows: (1) the court, in considering the petition to enhance
the defendant's sentence for involvement in a continuing criminal enterprise, is entitled
to rely on material which neither the defendant nor his counsel would ever see; (2) ille-
gally obtained evidence may be used to sentence the defendant to life without any real
protections afforded by a jury; (3) the right to confrontation is illusory under the propo-
sal; and (4) one element of the continuing criminal offence held the defendant guilty
unless he proved himself innocent. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4566, 4650-51.
242 Id. at 84, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEws at 4651.
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18583 to analyze the CCE's legislative history.243 In fact, the Sec-
ond Circuit never addressed Congress' resolution of S. 30's identi-
cal constitutional dilemmas. The court thus failed to recognize that
Congress could have remedied the provision's constitutional defects
without abandoning the post-conviction sentence-enhancement for-
mat. This omission has proven fatal to the Second Circuit's inter-
pretation of section 848's legislative history.
S. 30 was first introduced in the Senate in 1969. After enter-
taining limited constitutional criticism of S. 30,244 the Senate con-
cluded that Title X represented the best efforts "to draft fair and
effective sentencing provisions that are consistent with basic consti-
tutional protections and that will afford society every protection
possible in a difficult and delicate area of law."
'245
After the bill passed in the Senate, the House began delibera-
tions in early 1970.246 At the House Hearings on Organized Crime
Control, 247 serious constitutional objections to Tide X surfaced.
Among the more vocal opponents of Title X was the Chairman of
the Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York.248 In addition to criticism, the American
Bar Association offered eight amendments to Title X to remedy de-
fects within the proposed bill.249 More importantly, the suggested
amendments would provide Title X with the necessary procedural
protection to pass constitutional muster without having to jettison
the post-conviction sentence-enhancement format.250 Congress
thus did not have to make Title X of S. 30 a separate offense. In-
243 See United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021
(1988).
244 See Senate Hearings, supra note 234, at 467-74 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Dir.,
Washington Office of A.C.L.U.) (vagueness and due process concerns); id. at 216, 218
(report of Comm. on Federal Legislation of N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n) (opposed to
increased sentences due to person's criminal status).
245 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1969).
246 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
247 Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30 and related proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciazy, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter House Organized
Crime Control Hearings].
248 See House Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 247, at 342. The New York
Bar's criticism of S.30 is of special significance because the H.R. Rep. No. 1444 on the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise indicates that the Bar's conclusion applied to the origi-
nal CCE provision as well. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
249 House Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 247, at 538, 544-547 (statement of
Edward L. Wright, President-elect A.B.A.). "[I]f these eight amendments to title X are
adopted, title X will without exception conform to the A.B.A. standards and the formal
position of the A.B.A." 116 CONG. REc. 35201, 35203 (1970) (letter of Edward L.
Wright to Hon. Emanuel Celler).
250 "The ABA suggested only a limited number of specific amendments, preserving
the basic ihrust and concept of each of the various titles of S.30." Id.
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stead, the proposed A.B.A. amendments represented a less drastic,
but equally effective, remedy for S. 30's constitutional defects.
Indeed, the House did not make Title X a separate offense; it
adopted the A.B.A. amendments. During the floor debates, Repre-
sentative Poff announced the proposed changes to the Senate ver-
sion of Title X, explaining that "Title X has been modified to reflect
[the] specific suggestions of the ABA to make it more nearly con-
form to the ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures.'"251 The Senate accepted the House amendments 2 52
and S. 30, with Title X remaining a post-conviction sentence-en-
hancement provision, was signed into law.2 53 Title X thus became
18 U.S.C. sections 3575-3578.254 Subsequent court cases have up-
held the constitutionality of these provisions. 255
Congress thus had two options for resolving the identical con-
stitutional crisis facing the original versions of the CCE. The fact
that Congress made the CCE a separate offense instead of adopting
the A.B.A. amendments, as it did with S. 30, indicates that Congress
acted with a broader intention than simply remedying the alleged
constitutional defects of the initial provision.
The subtleties of Congress' actions on section 848 are even
more noticeable when 21 U.S.C. section 849, Dangerous Special
Drug Offender Sentencing, is added to the picture. On September
24, 1970, Representative Poff offered an amendment to add two ad-
ditional sections to H.R. 18583,256 which by this time incorporated
the Dingell Amendment. Poff's proposed amendment, which was
later codified as 21 U.S.C. section 849, adopted the very option that
Congress had previously rejected by accepting the Dingell amend-
ment. On the House floor, Representative Poff explained that his
amendment
is essentially the same as title X of the Organized Crime Control Act
[S.30] favorably reported by the [House] Committee on the Judici-
ary.... [I]t incorporates the substantive and procedural changes rec-
ommended by the board of governors of the American Bar
Association, and those changes I think better protect the rights of the
251 116 CONG. REc. 35297 (1970).
252 116 CONG. REC. 36296 (1970).
253 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, title x, § 1001(a), Oct. 15,
1970, 84 Stat. 948, 949-51.
254 However, these sections were repealed in 1984 as part of the effort to reduce judi-
cial discretion in sentencing. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II,
ch. II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987.
255 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1073 (1980); United States v. Inendino, 463 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
256 116 CONG. REC. 33630 (1970).
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accused and better structure the penalty package. 257
Thus,
[T]itle X of the Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. sections
3575-3578 and section 849 of Title 21, U.S.C., are, for the purposes of
... constitutional attack, interchangeable, and legislative debates and
scholarly criticism which were sparked by Title X provide the most
useful source material in studying section 849.258
Congress had its cake and ate it too. Instead of choosing be-
tween the two options capable of resolving the constitutional dilem-
mas of the original version of H.R. 18583, Congress chose both. It
made 21 U.S.C. section 848 a separate offense and then proceeded
to adopt 21 U.S.C. section 849, which incorporated the very provi-
sions that would have resulted had Congress forsaken the Dingell
Amendment for the proposed A.B.A. recommendations. The Sev-
enth Circuit in Pino-Perez259 recognized as much, but failed to prop-
erly explain the consequences. 260
To review the legislative history of section 848 and conclude, as
did the Second Circuit, that Congress adopted the Dingell amend-
ment solely to resolve the constitutional challenges facing the CCE
is far too simplistic. The adoption of 21 U.S.C. section 849, at the
very least, demonstrates as much. The Second Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the legislative history is thus refuted; only the Seventh Cir-
cuit's argument that 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) applies to the entire
criminal code remains unscathed. Congress certainly did not adopt
the Dingell amendment for the express purpose of applying aider
and abettor liability to section 848. Nonetheless, Congress chose to
make the continuing criminal enterprise a separate offense; in so do-
ing, it opened the door for application of aider and abettor liability.
This analysis thus demonstrates that aider and abettor liability
applies to the CCE. Both the case law and the legislative history
endorse this result. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in
Pino-Perez is correct: any individual who purposefully provides sig-
nificant assistance to a kingpin with the intent that the enterprise
257 Id.
258 United States v. Tramunti, 377 F. Supp. 6, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
259 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260 (1989).
260 The court wrote,
The opinion in Amen gives the impression that the conversion of the kingpin statute
from a sentence-enhancement provision to a provision creating a new and distinct
offense was an unconsidered last-minute switch. That is not correct. The Dingell
Amendment ... was debated extensively; what is more, the sentence-enhancement
provision was ultimately restored to another provision of Title II of the omnibus




succeed should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) and
punished under 21 U.S.C. section 848.
Part IV provides a practical demonstration of this principle.
Through the hypothetical scenario explained in the next section, a
prosecutor will be able to integrate the conclusion of Part I, namely
that the CCE may be applied to a gang-controlled narcotics opera-
tion, with the principle of aider and abettor liability derived from
Parts II and III. In the process, the CCE will be transformed into a
double-edged sword capable of striking down both the gang "king-
pin" who oversees the street-level narcotics operation and the indi-
vidual members of other gangs whose willing assistance facilitated
either the creation or perpetuation (or both) of the targeted drug
market.
IV. THE CCE, AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY AND THE CHICAGO
CRACK MARKET
The headline of the Chicago Tribune on Sunday, August 27,
1989, contained frightening news: "Crack Breaks the Chicago Bar-
rier." Chicago, which had somehow managed to avoid the crack co-
caine nightmare that was scarring other cities, awakened to a new
but more deadly variation of an old game. The particularly worri-
some aspect of crack's emergence in Chicago, the article explained,
was the possible role of Los Angeles-based gangs.
26 '
The Crips and the Bloods, spurred by increasing police crack-
downs and a rapidly deflating cocaine price, recognized that they
could make a two hundred to three hundred percent profit margin
by marketing crack in other cities. 262 Drawn by the lure of money,
the gangs began to spread across the country. Initially, authorities
believed that the spread of crack cocaine was "[m]ore the work of
individual members migrating to other cities than an organized
criminal enterprise. ' 2 63 By focusing on cities "[t]hat had little or no
261 Circumstantial evidence of a growing alliance between Chicago and Los Angeles
gangs, including a meeting in Las Vegas between high ranking members of the Crips
and leaders of a large street gang, has raised suspicions that "Los Angeles gangs might
be involved in the Chicago area's emerging crack problem .... " Blau, Crack Breaks the
Chicago Barrier, Chicago Trib., Aug. 27, 1989, § 1 at 16, col. 3. The evidence is still
inconclusive. Id.
262 Worthingham, Migrating L.A. Gangs Find New Turf in the Midwest, Chicago Trib.,
May 1, 1988, § 1 at 21.
263 Armstrong, Los Angeles Gangs Go National, Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1988,
§ 1 at 5, col. 1. See also Worthington, Migrating L.A. Gangs Find New Turf in the Midwest,
Chicago Trib., May 1, 1988, § 1 at 21 (police officers in numerous cities agree that the
mobile Los Angeles gang members are individual operators and not a closely organized
group).
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experience in dealing with gangs or rock trafficking," 264 the
"[i]ndividual members . . . use friends or relatives in the targeted
cities to set up drug operations. Eventually, they take control of the
local market." 26
5
Denver, which previously did not have a significant gang prob-
lem, followed this pattern. The Denver Post, describing its city as
virgin territory,266 noted that "Los Angeles-based black youth gangs
are primarily responsible for shipping crack to Denver .... "267
More importantly, the arrival of the Crips and the Bloods prompted
the creation of gangs in Denver affiliated with either Los Angeles
sect.268
However, as the Crips and the Bloods began to move into cities
with more entrenched gangs, their approach necessarily had to
change. Instead of trying to dominate the local market, the Los An-
geles gangs now focus on creating the infrastructure for the crack
market that will be controlled on a day-to-day basis by a local
gang.26 9 In addition, the Crips and the Bloods assume the role of
being the principal suppliers of crack to these new enterprises; in
this manner, the gang-controlled crack markets in various cities be-
come tied to the cocaine supplies of Los Angeles. 270 The Los Ange-
les gangs thus are instrumental in both creating and perpetuating
crack cocaine markets in other cities.
Crack cocaine's emergence in Chicago is consistent with this
more recent pattern.
The arrival of crack in the suburbs of Chicago mirrors the way it came
to some other Midwestern cities.... In Kansas City, Mo., and the twin
cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, for example, crack was introduced
by the Los Angeles-based Crips and Bloods street gangs. The gangs
264 Murphy, L.A. Black Gangs Likened to Organized Crime Groups, L.A. Times, Jan. 11,
1987, Part 1 at 23, col. 1 (late ed.).
265 Armstrong, Los Angeles Gangs Go National, Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1988,
Part I at 3, col. 1.
266 Chronis, Crack Fighters Seek to Head Off Epidemic, Denver Post, June 13, 1988, at 6A,
col. 1.
267 Id.
268 Garnaas, Crips Were First on the Scene in City, Then Came Bloods, Denver Post, May 12,
1988, at 8A, col. 1.
269 "SinceJuly, [the Los Angeles gangs] have gone underground. Often they carry no
identification and they don't hang around on street corners. They are here to develop a
distribution system. They make their contacts, deliver and leave." Robbins, Armed, So-
phisticated and Violent, Two Drug Gangs Blanket Nation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1988, at B14,
col. 2.
270 The role of the Crips and Bloods as suppliers makes fundamental economic sense.
"[Cocaine can be purchased for as little as $10,000 per kilogram in California, which is
considerably less than the $17,000 to $20,000 per kilogram paid by dealers in Chicago."
Blau, Crack Breaks the Chicago Barrier, Chicago Trib., Aug. 27, 1989, § I at 16, col. 4.
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first set up drug operations in outlying areas with black populations
and small, unsophisticated police departments .... 271
Indeed, "[slome Chicago and suburban police suspect that a similar
alliance could be playing a role in the emerging crack problem in
Chicago's poor suburbs, where undermanned police forces are ill-
prepared to identify and deal with the problem."'272
The timing of crack's arrival in Chicago is by no means fortui-
tous; it coincides with the decline of the once dominating El Rukn
gang. "Until now . . . crack has not spread in Chicago because
gangs associated with the sale of the drug have been unable to chal-
lenge the authority of the city's established gangs, who were content
with heroin and cocaine." 273 The decline of the El Rukns has cre-
ated a power struggle not only for control of "turf" but also for
dominance in the Chicago narcotics market. "Police say that much
of the violence can be linked to rivalry for drug markets once domi-
nated by the Rukns, the legally battered South Side-based gang
whose power is expected to decline as the government prepares
more charges against it."274 Reportedly, the gangs seeking to take
over the El Rukn gang narcotics trade are more amenable to the
introduction of crack.275 The environment is thus ripe for a cooper-
ative relationship between these west-side gangs and their Los An-
geles counterparts. Apparently, such a relationship already has
begun to blossom.
If the current trend continues, Chicago will soon face a sophis-
ticated crack market modeled by the Crips and the Bloods and man-
aged by the local gangs. As Part I of this Comment argues, the crack
market managed by the local gang represents a continuing criminal
enterprise. As such, the gang's kingpin should be prosecuted under
21 U.S.C. section 848. More importantly, as Parts II and III demon-
strate, the Los Angeles-based Crips and Bloods are quintessential
examples of independent third parties aiding and abetting the crimi-
nal enterprise. 2 76 Accordingly, the leaders of the Crips and the
271 Id. § 1 at 16, col. 1.
272 Id. § 1 at 16, col. 2.
273 Blau, 30 Killings Tied to Drug TurfBattles, Chicago Trib.,Jan. 1, 1989, § 1 at 28, col.
1.
274 Id. Indeed, the latest round of indictments is expected to decimate the El Rukns,
as the gang lost most of its principal leaders and its headquarters. See Gibson &
Gorman, Rukns, Robinson Indictedfor Drugs, Murder, Chicago Trib., Oct. 28, 1989, § 1 at 1.
275 See Blau, 30 Killings Tied to Drug Turf Battles, Chicago Trib.,Jan. 1, 1989, § 1 at 28,
col. 1.
276 Compare the Crips' and the Bloods' roles with that of Pino-Perez in United States v.
Pino-Perez. The Seventh Circuit declared Pino-Perez an aider and abettor for his role as
sole supplier of cocaine to a drug kingpin. The argument for extending aider and abet-
tor liability to the Crips and the Bloods is thus even stronger. In addition to being the
396 [Vol. 81
AIDING A DRUG KINGPIN
Bloods who are responsible for forging the relationship with the
Chicago gangs should be prosecuted for aiding and abetting a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise.
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primary suppliers of crack to the local gang market, the Crips and the Bloods provided
invaluable assistance in creating the market in the first place.
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